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Abstract 
 
The present dissertation focuses on the notion of philosophical thought experiment. In particular, 
the work aims at assessing a number of fundamental logico-epistemological features which seem 
to characterize both their internal structure and their possible use. The first chapter intends to 
show the philosophical relevance of the central epistemological question raised by scientific 
thought experiments. The second chapter aims at drawing attention on the central role played by 
our intuitions in the execution of philosophical thought experiments. The third chapter, finally, 
delves into logical aspects of the argumentative structure of most philosophical thought 
experiments and puts forward a proposal concerning the kind of reasoning they instantiate. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Oggetto primario della presente tesi è la nozione di esperimento mentale in filosofia. Il lavoro si 
propone in particolare di mettere in luce una serie di aspetti logico-epistemologici fondamentali, 
che sembrano caratterizzarne tanto la struttura interna, quanto il possibile utilizzo. Il primo 
capitolo intende far emergere la rilevanza filosofica della questione epistemologica fondamentale 
sollevata dagli esperimenti mentali scientifici. Il secondo capitolo si sofferma sul ruolo centrale 
svolto dall’intuizione nell’esecuzione di esperimenti mentali filosofici. Il terzo capitolo, infine, è 
dedicato a un approfondimento della struttura logica fondamentale di gran parte degli 
esperimenti mentali filosofici e avanza una proposta relativa al tipo di ragionamento che in essi 
ha luogo. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
“There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
than are dreamt of in your philosophy” 
 
Hamlet Act 1, scene 5. 
 
 
 
If he could look down into our restless world from the heaven of poets, William Shakespeare 
would probably be surprised to find out how far down the path of history his verses have echoed. 
“My own suspicion”, once wrote evolutionary biologist J.B.S. Haldane, “is that the universe is 
not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose”1. Half a century later, 
Richard Dawkins’ preface to the first edition of his ground-breaking work The Selfish Gene, 
opens with the following words: “This book should be read as though it were science fiction. It is 
designed to appeal to imagination. But it is not science fiction: it is science. Cliché or not, 
‘stranger than fiction’ expresses exactly how I feel about the truth”2.  
The belief that reality could have been different from what it actually is, it seems, has been 
around for a while in the Western world. In what is now the fifth book of his Metaphysics, 
Aristotle wrote: “We say that that which cannot be otherwise is necessarily as it is”3. This 
definition implicitly credits our species with a remarkable ability to imagine that things ‘could 
have been otherwise’. As soon as we acknowledge the finite nature of our cognitive abilities, the 
following two hard facts are immediately put in front of us as inquirers: while human beings, on 
the one hand, often imagine things which do not exist, their intellectual powers, on the other 
hand, have just as often been far from sufficient to imagine the existence of things which do in 
fact exist. In our relentless effort to understand reality, that is, imagination has often proved to be 
a very deceptive ally. And yet very few people, I believe, would be willing to deny that 
imagination plays a fundamental role in human understanding. 
 
                                               
1
 Haldane (1927: 286). 
2
 Dawkins (2006 [1976]: xxi). My emphasis. 
3
 Aristotle, Metaphysics 1015b. Translated by W. D. Ross. 
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The present work originated from a personal interest in what in the last chapter I have proposed 
to call the boundaries of heuristic fertility of our imagination. While indeed the very existence of 
such boundaries, on the one hand, seems to most of us just an obvious fact, any attempt at 
charting their exact topography, on the other, strikes us just as obviously as a nearly impossible 
task. Starting from such premises, my attention was naturally drawn to the almost ubiquitous use 
of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy.  
As a matter of fact, despite their popularity among philosophers, I could not help but finding this 
philosophical practice deeply disappointing. Annoyed by my insistently professed inability to 
understand the “wonderful” piece of modern art that he was trying to draw my attention to, an art 
historian friend once spoke up his frustration by impatiently telling me that all I really needed to 
understand a painting was a chair. Now, be that as it may for the case of modern art, the idea that 
that very same chair, or a more comfortable version of it for that matter, say an armchair, could 
also be sufficient to understand the world we live in, seemed to me as utterly wrong minded, if 
not slightly pathological. And yet, over the last few decades, thought experiments have 
undeniably become an apparently fundamental item within the bag of tools of most analytic 
philosophers, and I felt the need to inquire more carefully into their nature. 
As a matter of fact, starting at least from the early seventies, an abundant use of thought-
experimental reasoning has characterized a considerably large number of philosophical debates 
in areas as far apart as ethics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology. As 
a consequence, starting from the early eighties, a consistent amount of attention has been 
directed by several authors both to the inner workings and to the general purposes of these 
strange philosophical creatures. Their reflections on the topic have soon generated a complex 
and very lively debate which touches upon various philosophically relevant issues. My 
considerations revolve around that debate and try to focus on the aspects of it that I find most 
relevant from an epistemological point of view. 
Although the work focuses primarily on philosophical thought experiments, it traces some of the 
fundamental epistemological problems they raise back to scientific thought experiments, and 
begins therefore by introducing this latter family of mental procedures. This choice was also 
intended to stress and to help appreciating better the close resemblance that the two kinds of 
thought experiments bear to one another. As I hope will emerge in the next three chapters, I 
mainly think of philosophical thought experiments as of a sort of tools available to the 
philosopher to put his intellectual house in order, as someone has written. 
In my effort to understand their nature, and the limits of their fruitful use, I like to think of 
myself as of an inquisitive naturalist, who is trying to come to grips with a very puzzling feature 
of human cognitive life. Our ability to perform philosophical thought experiments, I believe, is 
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largely dependent on our non-philosophical ability to transcend the actual in thought by 
reflecting on hypothetical states of affairs, which seems to appear quite early in our cognitive 
lives. As a consequence, I think that the more or less useful or successful performing of 
philosophical thought experiments will depend crucially on the more or less careful reliance on 
this ability, to which the bulk of the third chapter will be devoted. In trying to present the main 
lines of the debate mentioned above, many positions which are certainly worth of investigation 
were unavoidably left out. I am well aware of the fact that this choice, if not argued for, runs the 
risk of appearing exceedingly idiosyncratic. As a promissory note in my defence, I can only say 
that the reasons of my choice will become clearer along the way. 
In a somewhat collateral way, this work intends to contribute to a larger methodological 
reflection on philosophical activity. In this I share company with Richard Foley, who, borrowing 
a line from one of my favourite poets, Robert Frost, has suggested to envision philosophy as “a 
momentary stay against confusion”4. The fundamental idea, he goes on to say, is that “one is 
doing the best he can, given one’s present tools […] to provide a coherent intellectual picture”5.  
As I hope will become clear in what follows, I am also very sympathetic to the position 
advocated by one of the pioneers of the debate I mentioned earlier, namely Roy Sorensen, who 
has envisioned thought experiments as instances of what he has called a cleansing model of 
armchair inquiry, according to which the ultimate end of this practice would be that of making us 
more rational by detecting various forms of inconsistencies contained in our beliefs.  
An important side effect of this activity, I contend, is that of enhancing our understanding of 
what each one of us chooses to call reality. Although some might find it intellectually disturbing, 
this last formulation is meant to suggest that I do not mean to address head-on the centuries old 
debate between realists and antirealists. I believe that, insofar as thought experiments contribute 
to a better understanding of our conceptual framework, they make us aware of the more or less 
tacitly held folk theories relying on which we navigate the world, and this, in turn, indirectly 
enhances our understanding of it. The emphasis Thomas Kuhn has placed on the tight link 
between nature and our conceptual apparatus, I think, is on the right track when one is trying to 
assess the cognitive powers of thought experiments. 
 
Here, in short, is the plan of the work. The first chapter aims at assessing the philosophical 
relevance of thought experiments in the natural sciences. It tries, in other words, to address the 
question as to why philosophers should be interested in scientific thought experiments. In order 
to provide a rough idea of the kind of reasoning involved in a thought experiment, a few 
                                               
4
 Foley (1998: 247). 
5
 Foley (1998: 247). 
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paradigmatic instances of such curious devices are presented. These fictional narratives, it is 
argued, are bound to raise a puzzling epistemological question, namely: How can a scientific 
thought experiment manage to be informative about the world we live in without adding new 
empirical data by means of actual experimenting? Repeated attempts at addressing this question, 
it is observed, have generated over the last decades what I suggest to look at as various different 
epistemologies of thought experiments. Consequently, a brief survey is provided of what I take 
to be the most influential positions that have been advocated on this topic. The main purpose of 
the overview is that of ‘measuring the price’ of maintaining the central claims of each different 
position. In the light of the philosophical debate generated by the different stances, an attempt is 
made at assessing the tenability of a widely spread empiricist view which tends to commit 
science to a strictly a posteriori methodology. The extensive use of thought experiments made 
by several modern scientists, it is claimed, suggests the plausibility of a less drastic divide 
between scientific and philosophical investigations, insofar as it seems to extend the jurisdiction 
of philosophy beyond the scope of pure conceptual analysis, while at the same time proving the 
effectiveness of armchair methods within empirical science itself. A further intent of the chapter 
is to show how this search for a viable epistemology of thought experiments has contributed to 
make the existence of a purportedly sharp divide between a context of discovery and a context of 
justification appear less obvious. 
 
In the second chapter, I move on to consider philosophical thought experiments, which I take to 
be one of the most striking methodological features of the new mainstream in analytic 
philosophy, which followed the gradual waning of the logical empiricist program and started a 
new season of  theorizing in many areas of philosophy. Following the lead of the first chapter, I 
begin by introducing a few examples of what I think may be regarded as paradigmatic instances 
of philosophical thought experiments. The main intent is that of drawing attention to the fact that 
these argumentative strategies rely heavily on intuitions, thereby proving to consider them as 
essentially reliable epistemic sources. I argue that skepticism about thought experiments is 
generally and ultimately amenable to skepticism about intuitions, and I therefore try to inquire 
into these psychological states by considering some of the proposals that have been advanced in 
the literature concerning their nature and their possible uses. In what follows, I analyse a typical 
use of intuitions by focusing on what many have taken to be the canonical example of intuition-
based philosophical methodology, namely conceptual analysis. As traditionally practiced, 
conceptually analysis presupposes a classical theory of concepts, according which concepts 
would possess a specifiable definitional structure that expresses the necessary and sufficient 
conditions a particular object has to satisfy in order to fall under a given concept. Nonetheless, as 
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I try to argue, a more careful consideration of its internal structure suggests that conceptual 
analysis should rather presuppose a theory theory of concepts, according to which conceptual 
categorization is a process that strongly resembles scientific theorizing. Conceptual analysis, I 
contend, should therefore be regarded and carried out as a continuous process whose two poles 
would be concepts or theories, on the one hand, and intuitions, on the other. In the final part of 
the chapter I point to the fact that recent work in cognitive psychology seems to offer strong 
empirical support to previous concerns about the general reliability of our intuitions. The 
relevance of these empirical findings to philosophical analysis, I argue, while having been 
questioned on the basis of important epistemological considerations, can hardly be denied. The 
challenge for philosophical methodology, I suggest, is that of taking into account the results 
produced by cognitive psychology while at the same time preserving its normative role. 
 
The third and final chapter of my work approaches philosophical thought experiments from a 
different, although I believe complementary, angle. Temporarily departing from the 
psychological considerations of the previous chapter, I move on to consider some broadly logical 
aspects of their inner workings. The chapter should be regarded, in general, as a critical attempt 
at singling out the most salient features of what, following others, I take to be the typical 
inferential structure of most philosophical thought experiments. Human beings, as I mentioned 
above, can be credited with a fascinating ability to transcend the actual in thought by mentally 
entertaining hypothetical states of affairs. Insofar as philosophical thought experiments make 
large and systematic use of this ability, the kind of reasoning they instantiate cannot but be 
regarded as inherently modal. An assessment of the potential epistemic virtues of a philosophical 
thought experiment, in particular, as I try to argue at some length, should start by acknowledging 
the fact that claims concerning the way in which a certain proposition holds or a certain state of 
affairs obtains, ought to be thought of as always relative to a set of truths that we, more or less 
consciously, decide to keep, or at least treat as, fixed. It follows that the purported outcome of 
any single thought experiment, as I try to show by means of an example, will carry a very 
different epistemic weight according to the way in which we decide to interpret the modal notion 
featuring in it. In what follows, as an attempt to delve deeper into their typical argumentative 
structure, I consider two regimentation attempts that have been recently put forward in the 
literature an try to assess their merits. The regimentation proposal that I find more promising is 
subsequently applied to one of the thought experiments introduced in the second chapter and 
showed, by means of additional examples, to be a very useful analytical tool. A further 
fundamental feature of thought-experimental reasoning is subsequently taken into consideration, 
namely their appeal to counterfactual scenarios, and attention is drawn to the fact that 
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counterfactual conditionals raise a justification problem the solution of which is neither purely a 
priori nor purely a posteriori. In the last part of the chapter I try to assess the epistemological 
pros and cons of envisioning philosophical thought experiments as forms of defeasible 
reasoning, i.e. as special instances of non deductive inferential patterns. In particular, I consider 
a new classification of inference rules that has recently been proposed within the literature on 
non-monotonic reasoning and I suggest that it might shed new light on philosophical thought 
experiments. 
 
In the conclusions I try to take stock of the considerations developed in the previous chapters and 
to make place for them into as coherent a picture as I am capable of. 
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1. Thought experiments in the natural sciences 
 
 
 
1.1 A shift of interest 
 
 
Historically, the first use of the expression ‘thought experiment’ is associated with the name of 
the Danish physicist and chemist Hans Christian Oersted (1777-1851), who has been credited for 
having introduced the term Gedankenexperiment into the philosophical and scientific discourse 
of the Nineteenth century6. It is nonetheless fairly uncontroversial that the first extensive enquiry 
concerning the nature and purpose of thought experiments in the natural sciences is due to the 
Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916)7. Mach, as a matter of fact, was 
amongst the first authors to emphasize the theoretical relevance of thought experiments. His 
evolutionary approach to the development of physics, in particular, led him to deny the existence 
of any kind of qualitative gap either between everyday thinking and scientific thinking or 
between human and animal thought. Correspondingly, as one of his commentators has recently 
pointed out, according to Mach “there’s nothing essentially human about experiments”8. In 
particular, he envisioned though experiments as necessary preconditions of physical 
experiments9, thereby granting them a foundational role deeply rooted in the very structure of 
physical enquiry. 
Along the 20th century thought experiments have gradually passed from a condition of relative 
disrepute, under logical positivism, to a growing interest both in their inner functioning and in 
their epistemological implications. The general distrust showed by the logical empiricists toward 
thought experiments, in particular, can be traced back to the instrumentalist views of the French 
physicist, historian and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) concerning the 
relation between theory and experiment. The use of the “fictitious experiment” (expérience 
fictive) in physics, according to Duhem, had to be firmly rejected “because of the false ideas it 
deposits in the minds of students”10. Appealing to fictional scenarios, lamented Duhem, does not 
enhance our understanding of nature, insofar as it simply amounts to offering “an experiment to 
                                               
6
 Witt-Hansen (1976). 
7
 Mach (1976 [1905]). 
8
 Sorensen (1992: 190). 
9
 See Mach (1976 [1905]: 136). 
10
 See Duhem (1914: 201). 
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be done for an experiment done”11. The practice, moreover, would be circular, insofar as it 
purports to justify a physical principle by appealing to facts whose existence has not been 
observed but merely hypothesized, and this hypothesis, in his turn, “has no other foundation than 
the belief in the principle supported by the alleged experiment”12. 
One of the main epistemological tenets of the program of rational reconstruction of science 
championed by the logical positivists was the sharp distinction between the so called context of 
discovery and the context of justification13. The psychological processes relying on which 
scientific hypotheses or theories are arrived at, according to this distinction, ought to be kept 
separate from the experimental or logical procedures by means of which those hypotheses and 
theories are tested or justified. Correspondingly, thought experiments, from a logical positivist 
perspective, may well play the role of powerful heuristic tools, thereby contributing to the 
process of discovery, but they cannot contribute in any way to the process of justification, they 
do not have, that is, the power to warrant any conclusion arrived at by their means and do not 
have, therefore, any demonstrative value. A clear formulation of this stance, for instance, is still 
to be found during the mid-sixties in the highly influential epistemological views of the German 
philosopher of science Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997). According to Hempel, 
 
“Scientific objectivity is safeguarded by the principle that while hypotheses and theories 
may be freely invented and proposed in science, they can be accepted into the body of 
scientific knowledge only if they pass critical scrutiny, which includes in particular the 
checking of suitable test implications by careful observation and experiment”14. 
 
The fundamental creative aspect of scientific activity leading up to new discoveries, in other 
words, certainly “calls for imaginative, insightful guessing”15, but when it comes to the 
justification of new hypotheses the only legitimate evidential source is provided by real 
experiments. 
During the second part of the last century, a slow process of critical reconsideration of the logical 
empiricist epistemology and of the corresponding approach to scientific activity was followed by 
a new wave of interest in thought experiments. The focus of attention gradually shifted from the 
prescriptive  and definitional concerns who characterized the endeavors of the previous tradition, 
to a growing interest in more pragmatic aspects of science. New energies were invested in 
                                               
11
 See Duhem (1914: 202). My emphasis. 
12
 Ibid (202). 
13
 See Reichenbach (1938: 3-7). 
14
 Hempel (1966: 16). 
15
 Ibid (17). 
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exploring the actual practices and patterns of reasoning scientists made use of and this shed new 
light on the significant role played in their work by thought experiments. 
 
 
1.2 Paradigm instances 
 
Since any definition is largely a matter of stipulation, there’s almost as many definitions of 
‘thought experiment’ available on the market as many authors have written on this topic. As a 
consequence of this fact, some have regarded the matter as a merely terminological issue and 
have very reasonably suggested that an exact definition might be something we could easily 
dispense with, focusing our attention instead on a limited number of ‘paradigm instances’, which 
usually prove themselves sufficient  to recognize a thought experiment when we see one16. I 
sympathize with this approach, which I hold to be the most promising, and I find therefore 
convenient to begin by providing, in what follows, a few examples of thought experiments 
displaying a certain number of features that have generally been regarded as typical, in order to 
set the stage for further inquiry. 
 
 
1.2.1 Galileo’s falling bodies 
 
One of the most famous examples, regarded and treated by the literature as paradigmatic, comes, 
perhaps not surprisingly, from physics. In his 1638 Discourses and Mathematical 
Demonstrations Relating to Two new Sciences, Galileo set out to refute the Aristotelian theory of 
motion by showing that all bodies fall at the same speed. He did this by means of a thought 
experiment. It must be recalled that, according to Aristotelian physics, heavier bodies fall faster 
than lighter ones. Galileo’s thought experiment was specifically designed to show that this very 
assumption leads to a paradox, and must therefore be rejected.  
His argument requires us to imagine that a heavier body be attached to a lighter one and then to 
ask ourselves what would happen if the two bodies where to be released together. The point is to 
show that, within this setting, Aristotelian physics allows for two different and mutually 
exclusive answers. As a matter of fact, if Aristotle’s assumption were correct, then the lighter 
body, ‘naturally’ falling slower, should be expected to slow down the heavier one, and 
consequently the compound as a whole. On the other hand though, that very same assumption 
seems to justify the exact opposite expectation, according to which the compound of the two 
                                               
16
 Brown (1991:1). A similar strategy is adopted by Kuhn (1977: 241). 
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bodies linked together, being heavier, should fall faster than the previously heavier body taken 
alone. The two opposite answers lead to the absurd conclusion that the compound body must fall 
both faster and slower than the heavier of its components. According to some, as we shall see, 
Galileo’s thought experiment had the further merit of offering a positive account of the 
behaviour of falling bodies, insofar as the only way to avoid the paradox seemed to him that of 
assuming that bodies, regardless of their weight, fall at the same speed. 
 
 
1.2.2 Newton’s rotating bucket 
 
Sir Isaac Newton, the father of classical mechanics, is to be held responsible for a further thought 
experiment, which is contained in a Scholium to the definitions given in the first book of his 
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, and which has long been regarded by 
philosophers as paradigmatic. One of the general aims of the Scholium was that of supporting 
Newton’s substantivalist view of space, according to which, roughly, space would be a real 
entity, distinct from body, and to reject a relationist view, widely spread in 17th century and held 
notably by Descartes, according to which space would be nothing over and above a relation 
amongst bodies. It must indeed be recalled that Newton’s epoch-making treatise was based on a 
sharp distinction between what he held to be the true, absolute and mathematical notions of 
space, time and motion, on the one hand, and their apparent, relative and common counterparts, 
on the other. The thought experiment we are concerned with, in particular, was specifically 
designed in order to show that an adequate analysis of true motion must involve reference to 
absolute space, thereby indirectly proving its existence. Absolute space must exist, so reasoned 
Newton, because it is the only way to account for the undeniable existence of absolute motion. 
The thought experiment invites us to imagine a bucket half-filled with water and suspended from 
a long cord which has been twisted up on itself several times. Given these initial conditions, it 
does not seem necessary to enter a laboratory and actually perform the procedure in order to 
acknowledge that, were the bucket to be suddenly released, we would observe both water and 
bucket going through the following two, ostensibly different, stages. 
When the bucket is released, it begins spinning quickly on itself. At this time, water and bucket 
are in relative motion and the water surface displays a flat shape. As the bucket continues to 
rotate, the water begins to rotate with it and to climb up its sides, thereby entering the second 
(ideal) stage. At this time water and bucket are at relative rest and the water surface displays a 
concave shape. It will now be sufficient to reflect on the setting just sketched in order to 
conclude that the concave shape of the water surface, due to the receding of the water from the 
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axis of circular motion, cannot possibly be explained by appealing to the relative motion of the 
water with respect to the bucket. One can easily infer this by recalling that in the first stage, in 
which water and bucket are indeed in relative motion, the water surface appears flat. It follows, 
maintains Newton, that the only way to account for the effect is to postulate the existence of 
absolute space, with respect to which the corresponding absolute circular motion of both bucket 
and water is now occurring. 
 
 
1.2.3 Maxwell’s demon 
 
A third example is due to the Scottish physicist James Clerk Maxwell and is aimed at enhancing 
our understanding of the second law of thermodynamics by showing that it has only a statistical 
certainty and that it can therefore, in principle, be violated. A consequence of this law is 
normally take to be that “it is impossible to design a machine whose sole effect is to transfer heat 
from a colder heat reservoir to a hotter reservoir”17. As a matter of fact, according to classical 
thermodynamics, two bodies of different temperature, when brought into contact, will reach a 
thermodynamic equilibrium in which they both have the same temperature. Entropy, in 
particular, is a measure of this process and it approaches a maximum value once the equilibrium 
is reached. Intuitively, heat can never flow spontaneously from a colder to a warmer object. This 
can also be stated by saying that in an isolated system, entropy never decreases. Now, the kinetic 
theory of heat endorsed by Maxwell models gases as if they were composed of molecules. The 
large number of molecules requires that the mathematical description of their behaviour be 
statistical. Accordingly, temperature, in this model, is the average kinetic energy of these 
molecules. A troublesome consequence of the statistical treatment of these systems is that it 
allows for the possibility of an entropy decrease. In other words, once we buy into the statistical 
framework, we are committed to the claim that it is at least possible, although very improbable, 
for heat to flow from a colder body to a warmer one, thereby violating a fundamental law of 
classical thermodynamics.  
Maxwell’s thought experiment is aimed precisely at making this consequence appear less 
obviously absurd. We are asked to imagine a couple of adjoining chambers containing gases at 
different temperatures18. The chambers are divided by a small door, controlled by a little 
intelligent being. It has to be kept in mind that the temperature of a gas, according to the kinetic 
theory of heat, is given by the average kinetic energy of its molecules. Accordingly, in the 
                                               
17
 This formulation was slightly adapted from the one given in Norton (1991: 32).  
18
 In what follows I draw on Brown (1991: 37). 
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present case, each of our two gases contains molecules which are faster or slower than the 
average molecule. This fact allows the little ‘demon’ envisioned by Maxwell to quickly open and 
close the small door in order to let fast molecules from the cold gas into the hot one, and slow 
molecules form the hot gas into the cold one. As a result of repeatedly performing this 
procedure, the average speed of the molecules contained in the cold chamber will decrease, 
therefore lowering its temperature, whereas the average speed of the molecules contained in the 
hot chamber will increase, therefore raising its temperature. This, in turn, amounts to saying that 
the cold chamber will become colder, and the hot one hotter. There will occur, in other words, a 
flow of thermal energy from a colder body to a hotter one, contrary to what stated by the second 
law of classical thermodynamics. It follows that this law enjoys a merely statistical certainty. 
 
 
1.2.4 Einstein’s elevator 
 
A still further instance, perhaps one of the most famous thought experiments of the past century, 
comes from Albert Einstein. It is designed in order to justify the so called principle of 
equivalence. This principle establishes the physical equivalence between a uniformly accelerated 
frame of reference outside of a gravitational field and a frame of reference at rest within a 
homogeneous gravitational field. As a matter of fact, gravitational force as described by Newton 
appears to be incompatible with the new framework for the laws of mechanics put forward by 
Einstein’s special theory of relativity. Accordingly, the first step towards extending this last 
theory to gravitational phenomena was for Einstein to show that special relativity still applies 
locally within gravitational fields. He did this by means of a long celebrated thought 
experiment19.  
The experiment features an observer inside of an elevator in a region of space remote from 
gravitational sources. Both the elevator and the observer are being pulled upwards by a 
mysterious force which, being constant, accelerates them uniformly. Now, if our observer were 
to release a body from her hand she would see it behave exactly in the same way as it would do 
if the elevator were at rest within a homogeneous gravitational field, i.e. she would see the body 
swiftly moving towards the floor of the elevator. The main point of the thought experiments is to 
show that, in the described situation, no real experiment could possibly enable the observer to 
decide whether she is in fact in a gravitational field or not. This amounts to say that the 
behaviours of two bodies, one with respect to a uniformly accelerating frame of reference in a 
gravitation free region, and the other with respect to a frame of reference at rest in a 
                                               
19
 I draw here on Norton (1991: 136-138). 
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homogeneous gravitational field are observationally indistinguishable. Indeed, the same 
observer’s inability to distinguish between a region of space subject to a gravitational field from 
one that is not, would be produced by an analogous situation in which the unlucky observer were 
to find herself in an elevator in free fall within a homogeneous gravitational field. It is now the 
case that, according to a general verificationist assumption endorsed by Einstein and concerning 
the proper relationship between theory and observation, a good physical theory should not 
distinguish between two separate state of affairs which are not also observationally distinct. It 
follows that the observer’s inability to distinguish between the two scenarios described by the 
thought experiment provides strong intuitive evidence for the plausibility of the principle of 
equivalence. 
 
 
1.3 Instances of what? 
 
The examples given above should be at least sufficient to convey a rough idea of the kind of 
reasoning involved in a thought experiment. Nevertheless, it may still not be immediately clear 
precisely why or in what sense these imaginative stories, these “forays of the imagination”, as 
someone has written20, have come to be referred at by the expression ‘thought experiments’. 
While indeed, on the one hand, the word ‘experiment’ is not usually associated with the mere 
armchair contemplation of the structure of an empirical question, on the other hand it is not 
exactly straightforward how ‘thinking’ could be envisioned as a strictly ‘experimental’ activity. 
As a matter of fact it is certainly possible to argue that, in the light of our every day use of the 
terms ‘thought’ and ‘experiment’, the locution ‘thought experiment’ itself seems fatally bound to 
sound oddly oxymoronic. For similar reasons many have indeed found the phrase more or less 
intentionally misleading, lamenting that “a thought experiment is no more an experiment than a 
plastic flamingo is a flamingo”21, and have preferred to adopt the more neutral and general term 
‘argument’. In their opinion, as we shall see, any thought experiment, despite of its rhetorical 
drapery, can ultimately be reduced, in principle, to a corresponding and explicit argument. 
Others, by contrast, have felt that a similar reduction, regardless of its feasibility, would be 
seriously wrongheaded insofar as it would utterly fail to capture the real nature of these 
procedures. The only way to make sense of the peculiar form of persuasion produced by a 
thought experiment, they have consequently claimed, is to focus on its inherently psychological 
elements. 
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Performing a thought experiment, intuitively, does not require the use of laboratories or of more 
or less sophisticated instrumentation, insofar as its outcomes are not grounded on any kind of 
measurement but are qualitative in nature. Moreover, thought experimenting does not involve 
any physical manipulation of variables, unless of course we metaphorically stretch the meaning 
of the term ‘manipulation’ and take it to refer to a purely mental performance22. Scientists 
usually resort to thought experiments when ordinary experiments either cannot or do not need to 
be performed. This last eventuality, in particular, appears to be more directly relevant to the 
present discussion. It is, in fact, for this reason that many have decided to characterize these 
procedures as thought-experimental insofar as, contrary to actual experiments (performed or only 
envisioned), they are carried out, as a popular metaphor suggests, entirely in the “laboratory of 
the mind”23. Their conclusions, so it is claimed, usually strike us as compelling, and their 
evidential value, at first glance, does not seem to depend on their material execution at all. This 
is due to the fact that thought experiments seem to instantiate cases in which the mere reflecting 
upon a hypothetical scenario has the power to make us grasp some intuitive truths concerning the 
investigated phenomena. New and unsuspected features or properties of an entity or of a process 
seem to become immediately perspicuous to us after the ‘story’ has been told, and this is 
precisely what seems to render superfluous the material execution of the experiment. 
The experimental character of these procedures, on the other hand, is usually taken to lie in the 
fact that, similarly to ordinary experiments, their outcomes do not seem to bear exclusively on 
our conceptual framework. Both the intentions of the experimenter and the outcome of a thought 
experiment, it has been argued, explicitly purport to enhance our knowledge and understanding 
of the actual world, not our linguistic competence or our logical skills. It has been further 
observed that “all experiments work by raising the experimenter’s status as an epistemic 
authority”24. Similarly, as a consequence of the exposition to these fanciful narratives, the 
subject seems to be epistemically altered by the experience and to see the world differently. 
 
 
1.4 The fundamental question 
 
Despite our previous considerations, the reason why philosophers should be interested in this 
practice is still in need of careful considerations of a more abstract sort. We might begin by 
noticing that, while going through our examples, we might have had the impression, long shared 
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by many, that the very argumentative structure of a thought experiment has something rather 
puzzling in it. As a matter of fact, when first confronted with one of these more or less fanciful 
narratives, we usually find ourselves trying to assess what is ‘really’ going on in it. The 
paradoxical nature of these devices becomes suddenly apparent to us once someone brings to our 
attention an important general feature shared by every thought experiment: A thought 
experiment, as we already mentioned, purports to tell us something new and substantial about the 
actual world without at the same time introducing the slightest bit of fresh empirical information 
beyond the one that was already available at the beginning of the argument. By performing a 
thought experiment, it seems, a scientist sets out to learn something new about the world he lives 
in, and not merely about the time-bound and culture-bound conceptual apparatus relying on 
which he has been trained to describe that world. And yet, again, his reasoning does not appeal 
to any new empirical data beyond the ones he already had at the beginning of his inquiry. By the 
end of the ‘story’, then, we have undeniably gained new information, this information seems to 
be empirical in nature, and yet we are embarrassingly clueless as to where it might come from! 
It has been convincingly argued, I believe, that the puzzlement effect just described could be 
easily placed within the traditional debate between rationalists and empiricists25. As it is well 
known, one of the fundamental questions around which this epistemological debate has 
traditionally revolved concerns the extent to which our knowledge of the external world depends 
on our sense experience. According to the standard rationalist construal, insofar as no inference 
drawing process could be entirely justified on purely empirical grounds, at least part of our 
knowledge of the external world, and of the justification thereof must be a priori. Thought 
experiments, when taken at face value, seem to offer strong support for this idea. In other words, 
they seem to instantiate the perfect cases in which some contents of our knowledge intuitively 
seem to outstrip the information provided by the senses, which means, according to the 
rationalist, that this additional information cannot but be provided by ‘pure reason’ itself, 
however we might wish to define it. Galileo, for instance, seems to be a priori entitled to believe 
truly, and therefore to have a priori knowledge of the fact, that ‘all bodies fall at the same 
speed’. On the other hand, one of the central tenets of the opposite, empiricist tradition, requires 
that knowledge can only be gained, if at all, by sense experience, and since thought experiments 
provide no exception to this rule, a satisfactory explanation of their achievements cannot appeal 
to any mysterious epistemic process but must occur along empiristic lines. Where this is not 
possible, the existence of that very knowledge which the single thought experiment purports to 
provide is called into question. 
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Once placed within its proper epistemological background then, the question that has set in 
motion the whole philosophical debate about thought experiments seems to take the following 
form: How can a successful thought experiment manage to be informative about the world we 
live in without adding new empirical data by means of actual experimenting?26 In Galileo’s 
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, for instance, we find an astonished and 
sceptical Simplicio, the spokesman of Aristotelian physics, asking Salviati, Galileo’s stand-in: 
‘So you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? And yet you so freely declare it to be 
certain?’ To which Salviati confidently replies: ‘Without experiment, I am sure that the effect 
will happen as I tell you, because it must happen that way’27. 
 
 
1.5 Different epistemologies 
 
The question raised above could be rephrased in a perhaps more prosaic way as follows: How 
exactly do thought experiments achieve what they do (when they do)? Over the years, several 
attempts to address this question have been made. Those attempts have generated what we may 
consider as various different ‘epistemologies’ of thought experiments. In what follows, I’ll try to 
sketch briefly, and without any pretension of completeness, some of the main stances that have 
been taken in this regard. My survey, in particular, will focus on five different positions… 
 
 
1.5.1 Brown’s Platonism 
 
Following a tradition that can be traced back to the philosophical views of the French historian 
of science Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), according to whom “good physics is made a priori”28, 
James Robert Brown has tried to offer an account of thought experiments along a priori and 
Platonistic lines, the plausibility of which has been long debated29. As we shall see, some 
thought experiments, in his view, make a rationalist interpretation of science believable by 
showing that there is a part of our knowledge of the external world that cannot be accounted for 
along empiricist lines.  
In order to set the stage for his main thesis, Brown has developed a fairly elaborated taxonomy 
of thought experiments, the details of which do not need concern us here. It is sufficient for our 
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purposes to start by noticing that thought experiments, in his view, can be divided according to 
the role they play within our knowledge. In general, they can be regarded as falling under two 
broad general kinds, which Brown labels respectively destructive and constructive. While a 
destructive thought experiment consists of a “picturesque reductio ad absurdum”30, which 
purports to refute a rival theory by showing that a particular thesis endorsed by that theory leads 
to an absurd conclusion, a constructive thought experiment positively aims at establishing a new 
phenomenon and suggesting the best explanation for it. 
A small third class of thought experiments, which Brown dubs platonic, have the merit of 
playing both a negative and a positive role at the same time. Their pars destruens is specifically 
designed to refute an established theory along the lines of a destructive thought experiment, 
whereas their pars construens plays the creative role of bringing a new theory into being. Brown 
provides the following characterization of this third class of thought experiments: 
 
“A platonic thought experiment is a single thought experiment which destroys an old or 
existing theory and simultaneously generates a new one; it is a priori in that it is not based 
on new empirical evidence nor is it merely logically derived from old data; and it is an 
advance in that the resulting theory is better than the predecessor theory”31 
 
A platonic thought experiment then, according to the above characterization, displays two 
fundamental features, namely (1) it does not introduce new empirical data, and (2) it does not 
establish new logical truths. In Brown’s opinion, these two features constitute enough evidence 
to support his central claim: platonic thought experiments are epistemically very remarkable 
insofar as they “transcend empirical sensory experience”32, thus providing us with a priori 
knowledge of nature. 
Brown regards the famous thought experiment on falling bodies performed by Galileo and 
briefly sketched above as providing the standard example of a platonic thought experiment. In 
this case it is indeed certainly possible to show, by means of a deductive argument, that a logical 
contradiction can be derived from one of the fundamental tenets of the Aristotelian theory of 
motion. As we have seen, the claim that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones allows for 
two different and mutually exclusive consequences and must therefore be rejected as 
inconsistent. On the other hand though, according to Brown, no straightforward inferential 
process seems suitable, in principle, to lead the transition from the old theory to the new one, for 
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the simple reason that the principle according to which ‘all bodies, regardless of their weight, fall 
at the same speed’ is not a logical truth. In order to acknowledge this, it is enough to realize that 
the speed of a falling body, from a logical point of view, might depend just as well on its color, 
or on its chemical composition. It follows, according to Brown, that in order to explain this 
transition we need to appeal to some other kind of cognitive process. 
It is now the case that Brown’s Platonistic view of mathematics has led him to believe that, 
besides ordinary physical perception of material objects, human beings enjoy a kind of non 
sensory perception, which grants them epistemic access to some abstract entities. It also happens 
that a realist account of the laws of nature, recently put forward by David Armstrong, Fred 
Dretske, and Michael Tooley33, and readily endorsed by Brown, construes these laws precisely 
as abstract entities. The laws of nature, according to this interpretation, “are relations among 
universals, that is, among abstract entities which exist independently of physical objects, 
independently of us, and outside of space and time”34. This last metaphysical claim, then, 
provides the final ingredient of Brown’s Platonistic epistemology. “Just as the mathematical 
mind can grasp (some) abstract sets”, writes Brown, “so the scientific mind can grasp (some of) 
the abstract entities which are the laws of nature”35. This same sort of non sensory perception, in 
his opinion, is exactly what enabled Galileo to ‘see’ the relevant law he was trying to read off the 
book of nature, and to perform the leap which led him from the old Aristotelian theory to his 
own new one. 
One last important thing to be noticed is that, according to Brown’s construal of the notion of a 
priori, our perception of abstract entities is in itself fallible. As a consequence, Brown feels 
compelled to observe that, when referring to the epistemic achievements of a thought 
experiments, “the term ‘knowledge’ may be too strong as it implies truth; ‘rational belief’ might 
be better since, on my view, what is a priori could be false”36. If this wasn’t indeed the case, 
wrong thought experiments, i.e. thought experiments which, as it often happens, lead us to a 
false belief, would be left totally unexplained. As a matter of fact, according to Brown, just as 
the physical world may at times contribute to the production of rational, but false beliefs in the 
existence of various theoretical entities, such as, for instance,  phlogiston, caloric, or aether, the 
abstract world may, in the same mysterious way, cause the belief in the wrong conclusion of a 
thought experiment37. 
To conclude, Brown’s epistemology of thought experiments seems to have two fundamental 
requirements, namely (1) the existence of a non-sensory perception of abstract entities, which 
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allows us to ‘see’ the relevant laws of nature, and (2) the plausibility of a realist account of the 
laws of nature themselves. 
 
 
1.5.2 Norton’s empiricism 
 
By Brown’s own admission “if and antidote to [his] gung-ho Platonism should be needed, then it 
can be found in either Norton’s empiricism or Sorensen’s naturalism”38. While Sorensen’s views 
will be taken care of in one of the next sections, I will now try to provide a brief outline of a 
stance first put forward by John Norton39 and which can be regarded as an empiricist reaction to 
Brown’s own proposals. 
The enthusiasm emphasized in the above quotation, as we have seen, has led Brown to see 
thought experiments as epistemically very remarkable. It is important to observe that, according 
to his general line of reasoning, the existence of (a particular kind of) a priori knowledge of 
nature has to be hypothesized in order to explain a supposedly ‘peculiar [epistemic] 
phenomenon’, i. e. the thought-experimental discovering of new facts40. It follows that, in case 
we were able to come up with a better explanation for that very same phenomenon in some other 
way, we could light-heartedly get rid of a priori knowledge of any kind.  
Now, Norton believes that, since “all knowledge of our world derives from experience”41, this 
last challenge can and must be met. His central claim is indeed that thought experiments, though 
certainly constituting a very useful and at times practically indispensable heuristic tool, are 
nonetheless epistemically quite unremarkable, insofar as they rely on our standard epistemic 
resources, namely “ordinary experiences and the inferences we draw from them”42. In particular, 
according to his analysis, “Thought experiments are usually introduced when the straight 
argument would be difficult to develop”43. In other words, they facilitate the accomplishment of 
a task which, in principle, could be completed even without their help, by means of an argument. 
Norton’s line of reasoning can be roughly summarized by the following conditional:  
 
if it is possible to reconstruct every thought experiment as an argument, then (this means 
that) thought experiments are epistemically unremarkable.  
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Norton calls the antecedent of this conditional, which he believes to be true, elimination thesis44. 
According to this thesis, in principle, “any thought experiment can be replaced by an argument 
without the character of a thought experiment”45. This would follow from the fact that since, as 
already established, thought experiments do not introduce any new empirical data, all they can 
do is reorganize or generalize what we already know. While in the former case they would 
function as a deductive argument, in the latter they would function as an inductive one46. Despite 
all appearances then, according to Norton’s deflationary stance, thought experiments may be 
rightfully seen as merely “picturesque argumentation”47. Accordingly, his view is neatly 
summarized by the following reconstruction thesis: 
 
“All thought experiments can be reconstructed as arguments based on tacit or explicit 
assumptions. Belief in the outcome-conclusion of the thought experiment is justified only 
insofar as the reconstructed argument can justify the conclusion”48. 
 
Since the conclusion of any thought experiment is indeed reached by ordinary inference, the 
fundamental epistemological point, according to Norton, is that “the degree of belief conferred 
by the thought experiment on it’s outcome coincides with the degree to which the reconstructed 
argument supports its conclusion”49. As in any argument, maintains Norton, that degree of belief 
depends on our degree of belief in the argument’s premises and in the deductive validity (or 
inductive strength) of the argument itself. As a consequence, to put it in his own words, “a good 
thought experiment is a good argument, a bad thought experiment is a bad argument”50. 
Norton’s main target being Brown’s platonic account, it is helpful to recall that Brown’s view is 
based on an analogy between ordinary physical perception and some sort of non sensory 
perception51 in virtue of which we are able to grasp some abstract entities, amongst which are the 
laws of nature. Now, in order to fully appreciate the spirit of Norton’s proposal, it is important to 
stress that he does not rule out in principle the possibility that thought experiments provide us 
epistemic access to such abstract entities; rather, his claim is once again a conditional one, 
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namely: if thought experiments provide us epistemic access to abstract entities, then “they may 
do so only insofar as these universals can be accessed via argumentation”52. 
Norton’s analysis of Galileo’s thought experiment on falling bodies provides an example of the 
way in which the reconstruction of any thought experiment, according to his view, should be 
carried out. It is quite uncontroversial that the first part of the thought experiment, in which 
Galileo rejects the Aristotelian theory of motion, is a straightforward reductio argument. 
Accordingly, Norton reconstructs its characteristic inferential structure in eight steps, leading 
from the assumption required for the reductio proof (1), namely that ‘the speed of fall of bodies 
is proportionate to their weights’, to the denial of that same assumption (8) 53. It is not important 
here to follow Norton’s reconstruction step by step. It is enough for our purposes to observe that, 
according to Norton, step (8) is where Brown’s ‘platonic leap’ into the new theory occurs, the 
moment in which the platonic law according to which ‘all bodies fall at the same speed’ is 
directly ‘perceived’. Norton, by contrast, holds that our degree of belief in that law, and hence in 
Galileo’s new theory, depends rather on our belief in the tacit assumption (8a) according to 
which ‘the speed of fall of bodies depends only on their weights’54. It is in virtue of this 
assumption, according to his analysis, that the final outcome can be reached via a simple 
inferential process, reconstructed by Norton as follows55: 
 
8a. Assumption: The speed of fall of bodies depends only on their weights. 
8b. Assumption: The speed of fall of bodies is some arbitrary monotonic increasing 
function of their weights. 
8c. From 3, 556. If the function is anywhere strictly increasing, then we can find a 
composite body whose speed of fall is intermediate between the speed of fall of its lighter 
components. 
8d. The consequent of 8c contradicts 8b. 
9. From 8d. The function is constant. All stones fall alike. 
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In particular, according to Norton, assumption 8b constitutes “the most general viable theory”57 
of the behaviour of falling bodies, a special case of which would be Galileo’s own theory. As a 
matter of fact, Norton observes, any function other than Galileo’s would be rejected by a similar 
reductio argument. The above considerations, according to Norton, are enough to show that the 
reductio argument 1-8 can be generalized to yield Galileo’s theory without being compelled to 
rely on any mysterious ‘platonic leap’, or to appeal to any kind of a priori knowledge. 
 
 
1.5.3 Kuhn’s constructivism 
 
A third, highly influential view is due to the historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn 
(1922-1996). In a famous paper first published in 1964 Kuhn addresses the three following 
questions: 
 
1. What do we learn from a thought experiment?  
2. How does a thought experiment increase our knowledge of nature? 
3. Which conditions must a thought experiment satisfy in order for us to learn something 
from it?58  
 
In what follows I will try to provide a brief outline of his answers to these questions. 
At the very heart of Kuhn’s ideas concerning thought experiments lies the general assumption 
according to which nature and the conceptual apparatus relying on which we try to understand it 
are jointly implicated. Based on this assumption, Kuhn rejects as misdirected the received view 
according to which the kind of understanding produced by thought experiments would not really 
be an understanding of nature, but rather of the scientist’s conceptual apparatus. The only 
function of a thought experiment, according to this view, would be that of correcting previous 
conceptual mistakes by enabling the scientist to recognize contradictions inherent in his way of 
thinking. This would also explain why, given the merely logical nature of its task, a thought 
experiment does not need to appeal to any new empirical data59. This account of thought 
experiments, according to Kuhn, is not tenable, in so far as it is arguably at odds with the actual 
development of physical science, which could hardly be envisioned as a process whose only 
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function is that of gradually dispelling logical confusions60. Although Kuhn doesn’t explicitly 
ascribe this view to any specific author, it is important for our purposes to recognize that the 
account just sketched reflects the stance taken towards philosophy by the Logical Positivists. 
Indeed, the linguistic formulation of empiricism endorsed by these philosophers, as it is well 
known, firmly denied the capacity of philosophical activity to exceed the limits of pure 
conceptual analysis61. 
Thought experimental scenarios, according to Kuhn, have the power to generate an experience of 
paradox by confronting us with a situation in which two previously well established criteria for 
the use of a certain concept happen to conflict.  
In order to exemplify this situation Kuhn compares a real experiment performed by the Swiss 
developmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980) with a thought experiment due to Galileo62. 
Both experiments, the details of which are not relevant here, focus on the notion of speed and 
share the common feature of producing two very similar cases of conceptual revision. Indeed, 
when confronted with specific questions concerning the motions of the objects observed (or 
envisioned), both Piaget’s children and the Aristotelian physicists are often forced to attribute the 
relational properties ‘faster’ and ‘slower’ at the same time to the same object, thereby revealing 
the presence, in their reasoning, of two different but mutually inconsistent criteria for applying 
the concept of speed. This is due, in particular, to their failure to distinguish between 
instantaneous and average speed. Eventually, the acknowledging of this situation will lead some 
of the subjects exposed to the experiment to a careful reassessment of the relevant notion. 
While on a standard logical empiricist account this outcome would be taken to constitute 
evidence for the fact that the notion possessed by the subjects prior to the experiment was self-
contradictory, the matter at issue here, according to Kuhn, is not the consistency of the concept 
itself, but rather the consistency of its use. Prior to the puzzling effect induced by the 
experimental setting, maintains Kuhn, the Aristotelian notion of speed was not self-contradictory 
at all63, at least not in the same way as the notion of a square-circle would be. While in fact the 
latter notion could not be instantiated in any possible world, the former could. We could indeed 
certainly conceive of a world in which all motions occurred at uniform speed and in such world, 
according to Kuhn, the Aristotelian notion of speed would be perfectly consistent, for the trivial 
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fact that in such world instantaneous and average speeds would always coincide. The 
shortcomings of the Aristotelian concept then, in Kuhn’s own words, “lay not in its logical 
consistency but in its failure to fit the full fine structure of the world to which it was expected to 
apply”64. 
This last quotation introduces us to the next fundamental feature of Kuhn’s view. For the same 
reason, adds Kuhn, we should rather say of the Aristotelian physicist living in the boring possible 
world just sketched that “consciously or unconsciously, he had embodied in his concept of speed 
his expectation that only uniform motion occurs in his world. We would, that is, conclude that 
his concept functioned in part as a law of nature”65. As a matter of fact, according to Kuhn, in so 
far as concepts are integral parts of the theories to which they belong, they do not work just as 
abstract definitions do in hypothetical-deductive systems, but also and fundamentally as natural 
laws66. Concepts, according to his view, display an essential legislative content or function in so 
far as they reflect specific ontological expectations of their users. It follows that the use a 
scientist makes of a concept ought to be regarded as an “index of his commitment to a larger 
body of law and theory”67. This fact, in turn, hints toward an answer to the first question raised 
by Kuhn, namely the one concerning the object of the cognitive achievement made possible by a 
thought experiment. As a matter of fact, by acknowledging the mismatch between his concept 
and the structure of the world to which it applies, the scientist, according to Kuhn, does in fact 
learn about the concept and about the world at the same time68. 
This construal of the potential achievements of a thought experiment offers further support to the 
thesis previously endorsed by Kuhn, according to which the historical role played by thought 
experiments would bear a strong resemblance to the one played by real experiments. In both 
cases, maintains Kuhn, a failure of nature to conform to a previously held set of expectations is 
disclosed to the scientist, and in both cases the specific ways in which this failure occurs can 
provide him with instructions about how to revise his concepts.  
Thought experiments, in particular, as opposed to real experiments, play this role by giving the 
scientist access to information which is already at hand and yet simultaneously “somehow 
inaccessible to him”69. The notion of ‘unassimilated observations’ (or ‘unassimilated anomalies’ 
or ‘incongruous experience’) plays indeed a central role in Kuhn’s picture and provides an 
answer to the second question raised above, concerning the functioning of a thought experiment. 
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It is precisely in this form, indeed, that nature fails to fit the scientist’s mental equipment and is 
therefore to be held responsible for the conceptual confusion induced by the thought 
experimental scenario70. Thought experiments, in other words, put the scientist in front of a 
situation which is potentially capable of contributing to the production of what Kuhn elsewhere 
calls a paradigm shift or a scientific revolution71. 
The seemingly steady advance of scientific research, according to Kuhn, is due to the fact that 
scientists tend to restrict their attention to problems defined by the conceptual apparatus they are 
trained to rely on72. This mode of problem selection, in turn, is bound to push observations which 
do not fit their theory-induced expectations to the fringe of their scientific attention. The 
paradigm shift mentioned above is then induced by the fact that, while some of those anomalies 
can be readily taken care of by small, local adjustments of the conceptual apparatus available to 
the scientist, some others cannot, and spark off a process of deep conceptual revision, eventually 
leading to the adoption of an entirely new conceptual framework, to which the previous 
anomalous observations are gradually assimilated. This process, according to Kuhn, far from 
being restricted to the actual experimental practice, is at the heart of thought-experimental 
situations themselves73. It is in this sense that  thought experiments, in his view, are “essential 
analytic tools” which can “enable the scientist to use as an integral part of his knowledge what 
that knowledge had previously made inaccessible to him”74. 
What we have said so far should at this point allow us to anticipate Kuhn’s answer to his third 
and last question, concerning the conditions that a thought experiment must satisfy in order to be 
effective, i.e. to teach us something. As a matter of fact, precisely because it draws on a sort of 
receptacle of previously ‘unassimilated observations’, a thought experiment, in order to allow us 
to learn something from it, must put us in condition to employ our concepts in the same ways 
they have been employed before. This requires in particular that “nothing about the imagined 
situation may be entirely unfamiliar or strange”75. It finally follows from the above that, in order 
to learn from thought experiments, the imagined situation need not only be one that nature itself 
could present, but it must also be one that ‘however unclearly seen’, has confronted the scientist 
before76. 
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1.5.4 Sorensen’s naturalism 
 
One of the most extensive and systematic attempts at offering a fully articulated general theory 
of thought experiments is due to Roy Sorensen77. The intent of providing a comprehensive and 
detailed survey of his views lays therefore far beyond the reach of this section. I will rather 
focus, in what follows, on two main aspects of Sorensen’s account, which I find to be 
particularly relevant to the present discussion, namely (1) his evolutionary epistemology of 
thought experiments, and (2) his analysis of their logical structure. 
Ernst Mach, according to Sorensen, has to be credited for having fully grasped the far-reaching 
epistemological implications of Darwin’s biology, as well as for having successfully applied 
them to the study of thought experiments. In so doing, Sorensen holds, Mach indicated a viable 
and liberating way to solve the age-old tension between rationalist and empiricist accounts of 
knowledge. Mach’s leading assumption was that natural selection favours in minds an ability to 
mimic natural patterns. This would allow humans, as well as other animals, to store large 
quantities of tacit information which their seemingly a priori intuitions would unconsciously 
draw upon when formulating synthetic judgements about the external world. 
Along the lines of the same evolutionistic account, Sorensen champions a form of  what he calls 
metaphilosophical gradualism, according to which the difference between scientific and 
philosophical endeavours should be regarded as a difference in degree and not in kind. 
Accordingly, he claims that both, scientific and philosophical thought experiments, regardless of 
their level of sophistication, evolved from a vast array of practical experiments which populated 
the every day life of our remote hunter-gatherer ancestors. Thought experiments, in particular, 
would not constitute new kinds of entities, but ought to be understood and treated as limiting 
cases of real experiments, gradually evolved by an attenuation of the execution element and a 
corresponding elaboration of the design element proper of every experiment78. While indeed, 
according to Sorensen, real experiments are aimed at raising or answering questions concerning 
specific relationships between independent and dependent variables by means of a process of 
actual manipulation, though experiments, on the other hand, purport to reach the same results by 
mere rational reflection on their experimental design.  
In addition to this, Sorensen explicitly parallels his evolutionistic thesis with a further 
developmental thesis, according to which children’s ability to perform thought experiments, as 
opposed to their ability to perform real ones, would appear later in life. Accordingly, he claims 
that “by studying the order in which children learn the skills, we gain evidence about the order in 
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which their ancestors acquired the skills leading up to thought experiment”79, thereby implicitly 
endorsing the well known biological principle according to which ontogenesis would recapitulate 
phylogenesis. 
Elaborating on Mach’s views, Sorensen’s account also aims at including a further feature of 
thought experiments within the same evolutionary framework. As a matter of fact, the seemingly 
a priori intuitions elicited by thought experimental scenarios appear to be modal in nature. They 
purport to give us access to modal truths about the world, insofar as they provide us with clear, 
ready to use instructions as to what could or could not happen given certain known 
circumstances. Sorensen is confident that ‘the right kind’ of evolutionary theory would prove 
itself capable of providing a naturalistic account of the modal knowledge at work in thought 
experiments. An adequate evolutionary epistemology, in particular, should rely solely on the 
evolutionary forces accepted by contemporary biology. Within this updated theory, according to 
Sorensen’s brand of reliabilism, the belief-forming mechanism responsible for the existence of 
our innate pre-theoretical knowledge of possibilities is to be found in the generate-and-eliminate 
process of natural selection80. This knowledge would be ‘innate’ insofar as, strictly speaking, it is 
not learned, but inherited from the experiences of our ancestors, and would thus constitute what 
Sorensen dubs “a poor man synthetic a priori”81.  
Evidence for this construal, according to Sorensen, would be provided by the fact that 
hypothetical reasoning, which makes extensive use of modal notions, reveals itself particularly 
useful for practical purposes82. The existence of tight links between practical and theoretical 
skills suggested by the cognitive gradualism mentioned above is then appealed to by Sorensen in 
order to account for the transition from these practical purposes to more theoretical ones. 
Adopting this kind of evolutionary framework, according to Sorensen, would allow us to 
envision the highly developed theoretical skills possessed by humans as welcomed ‘side-effects’ 
of those same biological mechanisms responsible for the selection of their practical counterparts. 
It is also important to keep in mind that, according to Sorensen, claiming that selection for a trait 
has occurred does not immediately guarantee the epistemic reliability of that trait. Natural 
selection, as Sorensen points out, does not logically entail reliable belief formation83. As a matter 
of fact, insofar as nature only selects for traits that prove sufficient to enhance reproductive 
success, “there is little hope of a perfect fit between an organism’s representation of the world 
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and the real world”84. Our instinctive or innate modal knowledge, in other words, might be 
reasonably expected  to be fallible. Nonetheless, it has proved effective along the evolution of 
our species, or else it would not have been selected for at all. The claim that evolution leads (or 
displays a tendency to lead) to reliable belief formation, according to Sorensen, is not immune to 
counterexamples, but enjoys the status of a very reasonable inductive generalization. This means, 
in particular, that although the outcomes of thought experiments will be subject to ‘wide 
fluctuations in reliability’85, this reliability is nonetheless underwritten by the principles of 
natural selection. 
 
As we mentioned above, Sorensen’s general theory of thought experiments includes a detailed 
analysis of their logical structure. This analysis serves the systematic purpose of providing a 
general framework under which particular instances can be subsumed. Thought experiments, 
according to this account, conform themselves to the standards of what Sorensen calls a 
cleansing model of armchair inquiry, insofar as their main function is to make us more rational 
by revealing and eliminating inconsistencies contained in our beliefs. As a consequence of this 
general view, he holds that every thought experiment is ultimately reducible to, and in a sense 
generates, a paradox, i.e. to “a small set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent 
propositions”86. 
Focusing on their negative function, Sorensen characterizes thought experiments as alethic 
refuters, arguments, that is, specifically designed in order to refute statements “by disproving 
one of their modal consequences”87. Accordingly, Sorensen suggests to envision thought 
experiments as “expeditions to possible worlds”88. If a statement, for instance, implies that p fails 
to hold in any possible world, then this statement, intuitively, can be refuted by finding a 
possible world at which p is true. This is also the sense in which Sorensen, according to the 
modal notion implied by the original target-statement, divides the class of all thought 
experiments into the two sub-classes of ‘necessity refuters’ and ‘possibility refuters’. 
Once reduced to the form of a paradox, every thought experiment, according to Sorensen, 
contains exactly five members, or propositions. In the case of necessity refuters, which he takes 
to be the most frequent, this reduction takes the form of the following schema: 
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1. S 
2. S ⊃  I 
3. ( I ∧  C ) → W 
4. ¬  ◊ W 
5. ◊ C 
 
The above schema is interpreted as follows. Step (1) symbolizes the proposition Sorensen calls 
‘modal source statement’89. This expression presumably refers to the fact that the statement is 
one from which modal consequences are likely to be drawn. Typical source statements, 
according to Sorensen, include items such as, for instance, semantic theses or law statements. 
The proposition formalized in step (2), in turn, draws from the source statement the modal 
implication that the thought experiment is aimed at rejecting (“I” stands therefore for 
“implication”). Step (3) is slightly more complex. It formalizes a subjunctive conditional, namely 
a counterfactual90, claiming that the modal implication (I) drawn from the source statement in 
conjunction with the thought-experimental scenario, (C, where ‘C’ stands precisely for 
“counterfactual scenario”) has an odd consequence (“W” stands for “weird”). Step (4) explains 
the odd consequent of the above counterfactual as an impossibility. Step (5), finally, claims that 
the situation envisioned in the thought experimental scenario (C) is indeed possible. 
The following, in turn, is the schema of what Sorensen calls a possibility refuter: 
 
1. S 
2. S ⊃ ◊ I 
3. ( I ∧  C ) → W 
4. ¬  ◊ W 
5. ◊ I ⊃ ◊ (I ∧  C) 
 
While the first four steps of this schema are similar to the corresponding steps of the previous 
one, its last step claims that the possibility of the modal implication (I) implies the possibility of 
its conjunction with the counterfactual scenario appealed to by the thought experiment. 
Sorensen is willing to grant that, in order to make every thought experiment fit the above set 
theoretic characterization, one must regiment its exposition in an often very artificial way. 
Nonetheless, one of the advantages of the present schemas, according to Sorensen, is that they 
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double as a theory of fallacy91. This is due to the fact that, by making explicit the different 
components of a thought experiment, they facilitate the task of detecting potential flaws. As a 
matter of fact, since, as already pointed out, the propositions 1-5 are jointly inconsistent, at least 
one of them has to be rejected in order to solve the paradox. This allows us to classify thought 
experiments according to which member of the set has to be rejected, while at the same time 
providing us with a reliable criterion we can use in order to separate good thought experiments 
from bad ones. Good or effective though experiments will indeed be those in the case of which 
the proposition to be rejected in order to solve the corresponding paradox is the first member of 
the set. 
To summarize, then, the advantage of Sorensen’s reductionist move is twofold. While on a 
systematic level the schema he proposes constitutes a general mould into which single thought 
experiments can be cast, on an epistemic level it provides us with a straightforward and 
profitable criterion which can be readily applied in order to assess whether a single thought 
experiment has been successful. 
 
 
1.5.5 Häggqvist’s holism 
 
The position I would like to close my survey with has been advocated until very recently by the 
Swedish philosopher Sören Häggqvist92. Häggqvist’s own reflections on the topic can be said to 
have developed further the approach to thought experiments first put forward by Roy Sorensen, 
whose views I considered in the last section. Nonetheless, I believe that it would be utterly unfair 
to label Häggqvist’s ideas as generally “Sorensenian”, as it were. As a matter of fact, far from 
simply commenting on the results of his ingenious predecessor, Häggqvist, as we shall see, has 
made a highly valuable contribution to the understanding of our present topic by insightfully 
elaborating further on Sorensen’s original formal framework. For this reason, I think that his 
achievements fully deserve a treatment of their own. 
Häggqvist’s general epistemological aim is that of contributing to the development of a 
normative theory of philosophical thought experiments. On a normative level, he maintains 
indeed, thought experiments purport to yield justified belief revision, i.e. to play a significant 
cognitive role in rational argumentation and theory choice93. The tenability of this claim, 
Häggqvist feels, naturally calls for assessment. While declaring himself skeptical about the 
possibility of providing a decision method which would allow us to deductively establish the 
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conclusiveness of any given thought experiment, a satisfactory theoretical framework, in his 
view, should at least be able to devise a reliable criterion which might be applied in order to 
discriminate between successful thought experiments and unsuccessful ones94. Moreover, as 
other inquirers before him, Häggqvist is not interested, nor event confident in the possibility of 
providing a definition of ‘thought experiment’ capable of encompassing all the different items to 
which the term has been applied95. Accordingly, he starts by circumscribing the phenomenon he 
finds most worth of investigation. He characterizes a thought experiment in the following words: 
 
“Something functioning, or intended to function, as an experiment, in the following sense. 
It aspires to test some hypothesis or theory. It is performed in thought – and is hence “real” 
– but need not thereby shun such prosthetic devices as pencil and paper, encyclopaedias, or 
computers”96. 
 
It should be further observed that the hypothetical nature of the scenarios appealed to by thought 
experiments in order to test theories, in his view, should not be taken to entail non-actuality, but 
rather “only that the situation contemplated in the thought experiment is entertained as a 
possibility in thought”97. 
John Norton, as we saw is section 1.4.2 above, has famously advocated a view now known as 
elimination thesis, according to which, roughly, every thought experiment can, in principle, be 
replaced by an argument, and thus dispensed with. In order to defend the opposite view, 
according to which thought experiments, just as ordinary experiments, cannot be identified with 
arguments, Häggqvist appeals to a very natural distinction between linguistic or truth-valued 
entities, such as theories or hypotheses, on the one hand, and non linguistic or non truth-valued 
entities, such as processes, events, or procedures, on the other. Contrary to arguments, he 
maintains, thought experiments, regardless of their purported epistemic virtues or vices, are 
neither composed of truth-valued entities, nor may meaningfully be said to be valid in any 
formal sense98. Qua psychological processes, maintains indeed Häggqvist, “experiments […] 
cannot, properly speaking, have a logical structure”99. 
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While fending off by this line of reasoning the radically eliminativist bent of Norton’s 
deflationary proposal, though, Häggqvist wishes to retain what he holds to be its most valuable 
underlying insight. He does this by maintaining that both thought experiments and ordinary 
experiments, while not exactly reducible to arguments, would necessarily need to be connected 
with arguments in order to achieve their ends. This connection, in his view, would be causal in 
the sense that, just as the physical events taking place in a laboratory while performing an 
ordinary experiment cause observers to hold certain observational statements true, the 
psychological events taking place within the thought experimenter’s head while performing a 
thought experiment cause thought experimenters100 to hold certain non-observational statements 
true101. Both observational and non-observational statements, according to Häggqvist, would be 
subsequently employed in arguments whose targets are the theories or hypotheses to be tested. 
Thought experiments, in other words, would be mental procedures ultimately aimed at 
generating acceptance, or providing grounds for believing in certain arguments102. 
Correspondingly, he acknowledges the existence of a peculiar family of thought experiment-
based arguments103. 
As I mentioned earlier, one of Häggqvist’s most valuable achievements is that of having 
developed further a formal regimentation of thought experiments which, compared to Roy 
Sorensen’s original proposal, should be given credit of representing and improvement both in 
generality and in usefulness. While its increased generality comes from the fact that Häggqvist’s 
regimentation, contrary to Sorensen’s one, is intended to apply to ordinary experiments as well 
as to thought experiments, its increased usefulness consists in its being closer to the actual 
dialectical structure of most thought experiments. Indeed, by Häggqvist’s own admission, the 
model he proposes “doesn’t assume that thought experiments in fact manage to achieve 
epistemic justification, but it allows us to see how they aspire to do so”104. While searching for a 
“feasible idiom” in which important features of thought experiments may be expressed, he 
adopts Quine’s maxim of shallow analysis, which reads: “expose no more logical structure then 
seems useful for the […] inquiry at hand”105. The schema for arguments connected to ordinary 
experiments then, according to Häggqvist, would be the following106: 
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(A) T ⊃ ( I ⊃ O) 
 I 
 ¬ O 
 ∴ ¬ T 
 
The first premise of this argument schema claims that a given target theory or hypothesis entails 
a conditional, namely (I ⊃ O), predicting that a certain outcome (O) will follow certain initial 
conditions (I). The second and third premise, in turn, claim that, while the initial conditions hold, 
the expected outcome does not occur. From this three premises  a conclusion is drawn which 
establishes the falsity of the initial target theory or hypothesis. 
The argument schema he proposes for thought experiments would be just a “modalized version” 
of schema (A)107, and could be regimented in the following way: 
 
(α) ◊ C 
T ⊃ (C → W) 
C → ¬ W 
∴ ¬ T 
 
“A thought experiment”, writes Häggqvist, “is typically designed to invite the conclusion that the 
target thesis is false”108. Accordingly, the above schema is interpreted thus. ‘C’ is the 
counterfactual scenario appealed to by the thought experiment. ‘T’, according to the terminology 
we established above, is the truth-valued entity, for instance a theory, which the thought 
experiment aims at rejecting. This target theory, according to the second premise of our 
argument schema, entails that, were the circumstances described by the counterfactual scenario 
(‘C’) to occur, then a certain “weird” state of affairs (‘W’) would also occur. The third premise 
claims that, in the circumstances described by the counterfactual scenario, the “weird” state of  
affairs would not, in fact, occur. Hence, as the conclusion claims, the target theory is false. With 
respect to the causal connection mentioned above between thought experiments and arguments, 
in particular, it should now be observed that, according to Häggqvist, thought experiments 
should be seen as generating belief in the premises of the form ◊ C and C → ¬ W. On the 
contrary, he maintains, it does not seem plausible to maintain that the thought experiment 
generates belief in the nested conditional T ⊃ (C → W), which is best seen as prior to the 
thought experiment itself. 
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Häggqvist follows Sorensen in holding that thought experimental scenarios are explicitly 
introduced in order to generate an inconsistent set of statements, or a paradox. With respect to 
schema proposed by Häggqvist, in particular, the inconsistent set would be the following: 
 
{ T, C → ¬ W, T ⊃ (C → W), ◊ C }. 
 
Now, observes Häggqvist, insofar as the inconsistency of this set can be eliminated only by 
dropping at least one of its elements, it follows that the argumentative moves available to both 
the thought experimenter and her critic in order to resolve the anomaly will coincide in number 
with the members of the set. This consideration, in particular, accounts for the fact that the same 
thought experiment often leads thinkers to different conclusions. For this reason, every given 
thought experiment, according to Häggqvist, ought to be seen as connected with four different 
arguments, corresponding to the four different minimal ways of resolving the inconsistency. This 
means that besides schema (α) above, which is the one corresponding to the thought 
experimenter’s intentions, we will now have three further schemas, namely (β), (γ), and (δ), 
which correspond to the argumentative strategies available to her critic in order to defend the 
target theory. The three new schemas would be the following: 
 
(β) T    
 ◊ C 
 T ⊃ (C → W) 
∴ ¬ ( C → ¬ W) 
 
Häggqvist dubs this schema the “biting the bullet” strategy for defending the theory attacked by 
the thought experiment. As a matter of fact, (β) aims at resisting the conclusiveness of the 
thought experiment by rejecting his core modal intuition, i.e. by denying that, were the situation 
envisioned by the counterfactual scenario (C) to occur, the “weird” consequence (W) would not 
follow. 
 
(γ) T 
 ◊ C 
 C → ¬ W 
 ∴ ¬  (T ⊃ (C → W)) 
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This, in turn, is the argument schema Häggqvist calls “irrelevance” strategy. (γ) aims at 
defending the target theory (T) by denying that it is committed to the “weird” consequence’s 
being true in the counterfactual scenario (C), i.e. by claiming that the target theory does not 
entail the counterfactual conditional (C → W). This is generally due to the fact that the 
counterfactual scenario, according to the defender, would be too far-fetched to be “relevant” for 
the theory under attack. 
 
(δ) T 
 T ⊃ (C → W) 
 C → ¬ W 
 ∴ ¬◊ C 
 
This last schema has been called, , for obvious reasons, “impossibility” strategy. (δ)’s defense of 
the target thesis, that is, points to the fact the scenario appealed to by the though experiment is 
indeed impossible. From this impossibility, the defender claims, both the counterfactual 
advocated by the thought experimenter (C → W) and it opposite (C → ¬ W) can be drawn. 
At the beginning of this section I mentioned the fact that a satisfactory theoretical framework, 
according to Häggqvist, should at least be able to devise a reliable criterion which might be 
applied in order to discriminate between successful thought experiments and unsuccessful ones. 
In the light of the above four schemas, it is now possible to introduce the criterion he has 
proposed. Insofar as a thought experiment purports to achieve justified belief revision, a 
successful thought experiment, according to Häggqvist, will be one in which “the premises of a 
regimentation with the form (α) are all justified”109. A failed or unsuccessful thought experiment, 
on the other hand, will be “one whose regimentation as an instance of (α) is such that its 
premises are not all justified”110. Now, the question as to whether and to which extent the 
premises of a thought experiment can be justified will not be addressed here. The reason is that 
this the problem cannot be tackled without previously introducing further considerations 
concerning the unavoidably modal nature of all thought experimental claims, which will be dealt 
with in the third chapter. 
                                               
109
 Ibid (2009a: 68). 
110
 Ibid (2009a: 68). 
 39
2. Thought experiments in philosophy 
 
 
 
2.1 Methodological concerns 
 
If it were allowed to squeeze a whole season of reflection on philosophy into a few paragraphs, 
our bonsai historiographical opus would probably be something like the following.  
Along the first three decades of last century, a self-styled linguistic formulation of empiricism 
known as logical positivism111 conclusively upgraded philosophy from his medieval position as 
handmaid of theology to a new and promising role as handmaid of a purportedly much more 
respectable owner, science. The logical empiricists, in particular, substituted specific 
preconditions of ‘cognitive significance’ to the well known Kantian preconditions of 
‘knowledge’, i.e. they imposed standards that any proposition had to meet in order to be 
rightfully considered cognitively meaningful112. Faithful to their own avowed empiricism, and 
following a tradition that can be traced back to David Hume, they divided all meaningful 
propositions into two general classes: propositions concerning ‘relations of ideas’, which they 
called analytic, and propositions concerning ‘matters of fact’, which they called empirical. Both 
classes were subject to specific methods of validation, the details of which do not need concern 
us here. 
To be relevant for our purposes is rather the fact that, contrary to empirical propositions, analytic 
propositions, as for instance those of logic or mathematics, were taken to be necessary, i.e. not 
revisable in the light of further experience. They enjoyed, that is, the epistemic status of 
certainty. This status, however, came at a remarkably high price. Analytic propositions were 
indeed considered certain, i.e. not empirically defeasible, precisely because, trivially, they were 
not taken to be claims about the empirical world at all. Their proper function, as it has famously 
been put, was rather to “record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion”113. Their 
necessity, in other words, was taken by the logical empiricists to be a merely linguistic one. 
In a sense, the program pursued by the logical empiricists represented at the same time both a 
gain and a loss for philosophy. The gain, on the one hand, consisted in the fact that philosophical 
methodology, as Leibniz had dreamed three centuries earlier, had finally reached a level of rigor 
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comparable to that of mathematics. The loss, on the other hand, seemed to lye in the fact that, 
contrary to what the ingenious German philosopher had hoped, the subject matter of philosophy 
ceased once and for all to be the world itself, to become instead the various descriptions of that 
world produced by the natural sciences. A striking consequence of this self-proclaimed “logical 
outcome”114 of British empiricism was indeed that claims formerly taken to be about the world 
were now found by its enthusiastic supporters to be in fact, although not explicitly, statements 
about language115. 
This seemed the be the case, in particular, of all meaningful philosophical propositions. Since 
philosophical propositions did aspire to some sort of necessity, and since, as we just saw, the 
only existing kind of necessity was taken by the logical empiricists to be a linguistic one, i.e. one 
concerning ‘relations of ideas’ rather than ‘matters of fact’, philosophical practice did not seem 
to have any other choice but to give up its age-old ambition of contributing directly to the 
knowledge of the empirical world. If a philosopher wants to contribute to human knowledge, 
Ayer had confidently declared, he “must […] confine himself to works of clarification and 
analysis”116, and the proper subject matter of such practice were, needless to say, the “factual” 
propositions produced by the natural sciences117. To make the same point from a different, 
perhaps opposite angle, we might as well say that, according to the same tradition, in so far as 
any claim, in order to be meaningful, must either be empirically verifiable or analytic, i.e. true in 
virtue of its meaning, and insofar as most philosophical claims were obviously not empirically 
verifiable, philosophical analysis was clearly not in the business of producing any knowledge of 
the empirical world, but rather in that of providing us with the logical-linguistic conditions which 
had to be met if such knowledge was ever to be achieved118. Philosophy in other words, 
borrowing terminology from Rudolf Carnap, was to become a logic of science. It had to be 
replaced, that is, by a “logical syntax” of the language of the latter, i.e. by a formal theory of its 
linguistic forms119. Failure to fully appreciate this point, according to the same tradition, had 
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brought over the centuries to notoriously interminable and unfruitful philosophical disputes, 
sparked off by the literally meaningless propositions of most western metaphysics. 
A thoroughly informed critical reconstruction of the multifarious and complex reasons which 
finally brought to the dismissal, or at least to the substantial revision, by most philosophers, of 
the original logical empiricist program, certainly does not fall within the much narrower scope of 
the present work. It will be sufficient, from the point of view of our discussion, to point out that, 
while retaining the logical-semantic apparatus relied upon and further developed by the logical 
empiricists, and valuing it as one of the major contributions ever made to both clarity and rigour 
of philosophical discourse, most leading figures of the subsequent philosophical tradition, 
starting from the fifties, have at least partially given up the idea that philosophical practice ought 
to be envisioned as a uniquely linguistic endeavour120. One of the most relentless critics of 
logical empiricism for instance, Willard Van Orman Quine, as it is well known, regarded 
philosophical work as continuous with the work of science, and granted to ontological questions 
a status “on a par with questions of natural science”121. According to the same author, one of the 
consequences of abandoning what he regarded as two ill-founded “dogmas” of modern 
empiricism, namely reductionism and the existence of a sharp analytic/synthetic distinction, 
would be “a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural 
science”122. 
Even if one disagreed with Quine’s prediction, it would still be difficult to deny that one of the 
long term consequences of the gradual waning of the logical empiricist program has been, as a 
matter of historical fact, the opening of a lively new season of metatheoretical reflection. Over 
the last three decades, as it appears, an increasing number of philosophers have felt the pressing 
need to address questions concerning the nature and limits of philosophical inquiry, as well as to 
clarify its possible relations to other disciplines, such as empirical psychology for instance123. As 
a consequence of this general tendency, philosophy has entered a phase of deep revision of what 
it was previously, and often uncritically, taken to be its standard methodology. In recent years, a 
growing amount of philosophical literature has been devoted to the analysis of current 
philosophical practice124, with an eye toward its several epistemological implications. 
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Starting from the seventies, original and substantial work has been made in several areas of 
analytic philosophy, such as philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and epistemology for 
instance. A striking methodological feature of this large body of literature is the confident and 
abundant use of a practice which, when taken at face value, seems to fly in the face of the 
stubborn anti-psychologism notoriously professed by the previous philosophical tradition125, 
namely thought-experimental reasoning. Although this practice, as we shall see in the next 
section, is not new to modern philosophy, most contemporary analytic philosophers seem to 
assign to hypothetical or counterfactual scenarios, and to the intuitions generated therefrom, a 
decidedly unprecedented cognitive weight within their theoretical inquiries. “Thought 
experimentation”, some has indeed gone as far as claiming, “has come to supplant meaning 
analysis as the distinctive method of contemporary analytic philosophy”126. Regardless of the 
tenability of the latter claim, thought experiments have undeniably played a fundamental role in 
most philosophical theorizing over the last few decades, and this centrality has sparked off a host 
of extremely interesting epistemological explorations concerning what have been called the 
powers and limits of imaginary cases127. 
In the following section, I will present a few examples of philosophical though experiments 
which, I believe, may be regarded as paradigmatic. While indeed, on the one hand, they have 
generated lively and not yet concluded debates within the analytic community, they display, on 
the other hand, a number of typical methodological features which I will try to analyse both in 
the present and in following chapter. 
 
 
2.2 Paradigm instances 
 
 
2.2.1 Mind swaps 
 
In the second book of his Essay, concerning ‘ideas’, we find one of the fathers of modern 
empiricism, John Locke, grappling with the general notion of identity, and with the problem of 
personal identity in particular. Since this last subject, as it has been put, “has probably exploited 
the method [of thought experiments] more than has any other problem area in philosophy”128, it 
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will certainly serve our present purposes to begin by restating briefly Locke’s views on the topic 
and to dwell on the nature of the arguments he deemed apt to support them. 
According to Locke, both our ideas of identity and diversity originate when: “[…] considering 
anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at 
another time”129. In such occasions, explains Locke, we are compelled to acknowledge the 
existence of the above relations by the fact of “never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that two 
things of the same kind should exist at the same place at the same time”130. It is now the case that 
substance, man, and person, according to Locke’s tripartite ontology131 and to his ideational 
views on meaning, “are three names standing for three different ideas”132. It follows that each 
one of these ideas will enjoy a different identity criterion (principium individuationis), insofar as 
“such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the identity”133. 
An animal, for instance, is a living organized body, and Locke does not seem to have any doubts 
concerning the fact that, if not direct observation, then at least what he calls an “ingenious 
observation”134 cannot but finally lead us to establish that “the idea in our minds of which the 
sound man in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal”135. Although Locke is not 
explicit on this point, one might happen to wonder whether there is any difference between a 
mere observation and what is here referred at as an “ingenious observation”. A difference, that 
is, capable of justifying his preferring the latter expression to the former. I think the following 
passage suggests a plausible answer: 
 
“I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a creature of his own shape and make, 
though it had no more reason all its life than a cat or a parrot, would call him still a man; or 
whoever should hear a cat or a parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or 
think it nothing but a cat or a parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational man and the 
other a very intelligent rational parrot”136. 
 
A dumb man then, according to Locke, stays a man; a graduated parrot, stays a parrot. The 
identity criterion of both man an animal seems therefore to be, in Locke’s opinion, the 
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possession of a body137. It is vitally important for our purposes to stress the fact that Locke, 
besides recording his own private intuition, declares himself confident that other people will very 
likely share it. The present case displays indeed a characteristic feature of his writing, insofar as 
he almost always introduces his fictional scenarios by means of phrases such as “it is evident”, 
“every one sees that”, “everyone finds that”, “everyone one who reflects will perceive that”, 
“every intelligent being must grant that”, or “everyone would say that”. I take the abundant use 
of such expressions to play more than a mere rhetorical function within the economy of his 
argument and to suggest that Locke explicitly meant to draw attention on the compelling nature 
of certain intuitions138. 
This being said of the notion of man, we now need to follow the same procedure in order to 
establish what personal identity consists of. We need, that is, to establish what kind of idea the 
name person stands for. Here is Locke’s own proposal: 
 
“a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, 
the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it; it 
being impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When 
we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so”139. 
 
It is precisely in virtue of consciousness then, in the sense of introspection140, that “everyone is 
to himself that which he calls self”141. The spatial and temporal bounds of the self, according to 
Locke, coincide with those of introspection. A unity and continuity of consciousness, in other 
words, often referred at as the “Lockean condition”142, would be essential to personal identity.  
Our consciousness though, by Locke’s own admission143, is often interrupted, for instance during 
sleep, and this makes it legitimate to raise a further question, namely: is the self sameness of 
substance, too? Is it, to put it in his own words, “the same identical substance which always 
thinks in the same person”144? This last question, in particular, is further analyzed by Locke into 
the two following subquestions145: (1) If ‘the substance which thinks’ is changed, can we have 
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the same person? (2) If ‘the substance which thinks’ stays the same, can we have different 
persons?  
Question (1), Locke tells us, can be restated by asking whether it is possible “that that may be 
represented to the mind to have been, which really never was”. Dreams, after all, provide us with 
clear cases of representations which lack what he calls “reality of matter of fact”. Their very 
existence, therefore, seems to render the situation envisioned in question (1) a genuine 
possibility. A possibility, that is, which cannot be a priori excluded “till we have clearer views of 
the nature of thinking substances”146. Question (2) in his turn can be restated, in a similar 
fashion, by asking “whether the same immaterial being […] may be wholly stripped of all the 
consciousness of its past experience” and “beginning a new account from a new period, have a 
consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new state”147. 
In general though, Locke tells us, similar questions, concerning possibility, are “difficult to 
conclude from the nature of things”148. They cannot be settled, one would like to add once more, 
by mere observation. A further ‘ingenious observation’, that is, seems to be required, and this is 
indeed where Locke introduces the famous thought experiment of the prince and the cobbler. 
Here are his own words: 
 
“Should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, 
enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, every one sees 
he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions: but 
who would say it was the same man?”149. 
 
Despite the fact that ordinary language tends to systematically conflate the two notions then, the 
idea of man and the idea of person, according to Locke, ought to be kept separate. Indeed, 
insofar as it is consciousness alone that “unites existence and actions […] into the same person”, 
maintains Locke, “it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other 
substances”150. Consciousness, to conclude, is what confers identity to the person, regardless of 
its being joined to one or several substances. Substance, that is, can vary without change of 
personal identity, provided that “the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one 
thinking substance to another”151. 
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2.2.2 The categorial hypothesis 
 
At the very outset of his wonderfully written introductory textbook on modality, Joseph Melia 
tries to show the apparent unavoidability of positing the existence of a large class of de re modal 
truths about the world over and above the purely categorial ones, in order to account for the 
meaning of our modal thought and talk. He does this by means of a simple yet, in my opinion, 
very well designed thought experiment152. 
The reader is asked to imagine being in possession of a complete theory of the world. This 
theory, explains Melia, enjoys the three following basic features. Its language contains a name 
for every object, that is for every single thing existing in the universe, and a predicate for every 
property which is actually instantiated in it. Everything our theory says about the universe, we 
are further asked to assume, is true. Our theory, in other words, accurately lists all there is in the 
universe. It further provides us with true descriptions of what every object is like, down to its 
most recondite details, and of the relations in which any object stands with respect to any other 
or others.  
At this point Melia asks the crucial question: “Does every truth appear within the theory? Would 
the theory account for every single matter of fact?”153. Giving a positive answer to this question, 
in his view, would amount to endorsing what he calls the categorial hypothesis. And yet, he 
maintains, “a number of philosophers believe that such a theory would not be a theory of 
everything”154. Many of us, that is, once put in front of a similar scenario, would tend to resist, 
upon reflection, the categorial hypothesis and would seem rather willing to grant that there must 
indeed be a whole class of truths about which our purportedly complete theory of the world is 
utterly silent, a class of truths, that is, that our theory simply lacks the linguistic resources to 
describe. 
An easy way to see this, is to consider the following two true sentences155: 
 
(1) Claudio is an ontologist 
(2) Claudio is a human being 
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Since (1) and (2) both ascribe a certain categorial property to Claudio, namely the property of 
being an ontologist and the property of being a human being, it follows, by hypothesis, that they 
both have to appear in our theory. And yet (1) and (2) seem to concern, so to speak, different 
ways in which Claudio possess or instantiates the properties that are being ascribed to him, some 
of which are contingent, whereas others are necessary. As a matter of fact, we might plausibly 
reason, our friend Claudio could have certainly been, or thought of himself as being, a theoretical 
physicist instead of an ontologist, without thereby ceasing to be what he is, namely Claudio. On 
the contrary, or so at least our ordinary intuitions seem to go, he could not have failed to be a 
human being, without thereby ceasing to be our friend Claudio. 
This difference between essential and accidental properties, according to Melia, would not be 
linguistic in nature. It would not merely concern, that is, the concepts we happen or decide to use 
in order to describe our world, but would rather tell us something substantial about the way in 
which the world is, something, moreover, the truth of which most of us would be willing to 
recognize as necessary. Melia’s point is that our purportedly complete theory of the world 
cannot, for the reasons we have seen, possibly capture this difference. It follows, according to the 
same author, that in order to capture this difference we must acknowledge the existence of class 
of de re modal truths over and above the purely categorial ones, and this gives us reason to doubt 
the correctness of the categorial hypothesis. 
 
 
2.2.3 Mary 
 
On a standard and very broad construal of the term, physicalism is the metaphysical view 
according to which everything that exists is either physical or supervenes on the physical. This 
claim, in particular, entails that, were physicalism to be true, then an ideally complete physical 
account of what our world is like would necessarily encompass all knowable truths about it. The 
same idea, many have felt, can be profitably couched it in terms of possible worlds by saying 
that “physicalism is true at a possible world w iff any world which is a physical duplicate of w is 
a duplicate of w simpliciter”156. Physicalists, in other words, hold that, if we ever came to learn 
everything physical there is to know about our world and whatever is contained in it, human 
beings included, there would not be anything left to know157. 
In a relatively short seminal article published in 1982 Frank Jackson famously launched a frontal 
attack to physicalism by means of a much celebrated and yet apparently very simple argument, 
                                               
156
 Stoljar (2009, section 3). My emphasis. 
157
 “Physicalism”, to put it in Jackson’s words, “is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is largely 
physical, but the challenging thesis that it is entirely physical”. Jackson (1986: 291). My emphasis. 
 48
which was nevertheless bound to spark off one of the most heated debates in contemporary 
philosophy of mind. Jackson’s knowledge argument, as he himself called it, was originally meant 
to develop further the intuition, already shared by several philosophers, according to which no 
amount of purely physical information would ever be able to account for the introspectively 
accessible phenomenal sides of our mental lives, also known as qualia. Towards the beginning 
of his article, the “qualia freak” Jackson put down his credo in the form of an explicit challenge: 
 
“Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the 
kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in 
other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, 
you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of 
jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, hearing 
a loud noise or seeing the sky”158. 
 
A person, in other words, might come to learn, and therefore know, all the physical and 
functional facts concerning a specific brain event, down to its most recondite details, and still not 
know, as Thomas Nagel would have it159, what it is like to subjectively undergo that brain event. 
“Nothing you could tell of a physical sort”, could therefore be the catch line of this philosophical 
stance, “captures the smell of a rose”160. If one were willing to grant him this “intuitively 
obvious” premise, Jackson confidently maintained, one would be forced to admit, by sheer 
logical necessity, that physicalism is false. Unfortunately, by his own admission, not many 
people in the philosophical community seemed ready to regard the cornerstone of his argument 
as obvious. This dissent, however, as it is often the case, proved very fruitful, in that Jackson, in 
order to make his point even more compelling, gave birth to one of the most popular and debated 
fictional entities of the last three decades: Mary. 
Jackson’s justly famous thought experiment introduces us to the life and deeds of a rarely 
talented prisoner scientist, Mary, who, as we are asked to imagine, is forced to investigate the 
nature of the outside world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television 
monitor. Within her room, according to the scenario, she does not have, nor ever had, access to 
anything colored. Nonetheless, despite her heavily impaired condition, and in virtue of her 
extraordinary intellectual capacities, Mary somehow manages to fit all the information that she 
has painstakingly acquired over the long years of her studies into a fully complete and consistent 
account of our world in general, and of the neurophysiology of human vision in particular. In 
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short, she knows everything there is to know about both brain events and the specific functional 
roles played by those events. As a consequence, based on her impressive physical, chemical and 
biological knowledge of both a single human being and her environment, she is perfectly able to 
predict, to an astonishing degree of precision, each and every event which will occur, from a 
microphysical up to a behavioral level, once that person is put in front of, say, a midsummer blue 
sky. To put it in Jackson’s own words, Mary, from her room, will be perfectly able to anticipate 
“just which wave-length combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this 
produces via the central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and expulsion of air 
from the lungs that results in the uttering of the sentence ‘The sky is blue’”161. Now, and this is 
the crucial point, given the above scenario, if physicalism is true, then there isn’t anything that 
Mary does not know. 
At this stage of our story the setting is ready for introducing the fundamental question. What will 
happen, the ingenious thought experimenter asks, once poor Mary is released from her black-
and-white room and finally enters our “colored” world? Is she going to learn anything new and 
thereby acquire new knowledge? It appears really difficult not to answer in the affirmative to this 
last question. It just seems overwhelmingly evident, that is, that she will learn, on her release, 
about an aspect of our world, and of our visual experience of it in particular, which she didn’t 
previously have any access to. Which term indeed, other than knowledge, could we be possibly 
use in order to describe the relation that occurs between Mary and the new experience she is 
undergoing? And yet, didn’t we say that her physical knowledge was, ex hypothesis, complete? 
The following line of reasoning seems therefore inescapable: Mary’s knowledge before release 
was incomplete, therefore physicalism is false. The following is a slightly modified version of 
the way in which Jackson proposes to reconstruct the structure of his argument162: 
 
Premise 1. Mary (before her release) knows everything physical there is to know about 
other people. 
 
Premise 2. Mary (before her release) does not know everything there is to know about 
other people (because she learns something about them on her release) 
 
Conclusion. There are truths about other people (and herself) which escape the physicalist 
story. Hence physicalism is false. 
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Generalizing from the case of vision to other mental states which arguably display phenomenal 
features or qualia, we end up with the same result: “The material or physical story about us is not 
the complete story about us”163. 
 
 
2.2.4 Twin-Earth 
 
Some thirty years ago, by means of a very famous thought experiment, Hilary Putnam proposed 
a view on meaning which has ever since generally come to be referred at as semantic 
externalism. That ingenious piece of “science-fiction”, as Putnam himself called it164, has had a 
very deep impact on both philosophy of language and, as we shall see, philosophy of mind over 
the last few decades. As a matter of fact some have, perhaps slightly too enthusiastically, 
claimed that “in 1975 Hilary Putnam changed the face of philosophy forever”165. Be that as it 
may, it will certainly be of interest for the present inquiry to introduce briefly the gist of his 
endeavors. 
Once upon a time, so the story goes, there reigned a widely shared view about concepts and 
about our knowledge of them166. According to this view, concepts were entities capable of being 
completely contained in the thinker’s mind, which was in its turn construed as a sort of Cartesian 
private theatre. Since the Middle Ages, continues Putnam, the notion of meaning had been 
parsed into the two notions of extension and intension. The extension of a term was generally 
taken to be the set of things to which the term applied, or, alternatively, of which the term was 
true. By intension of a term, on the other hand, was usually meant the concept associated with it. 
In particular, insofar as concepts were construed as mental entities, meanings (in the sense of 
intensions) were also construed as such. As a consequence, writes Putnam, no one belonging to 
this tradition “doubted that understanding a word (knowing its intension) was just a matter of 
being in a certain psychological state”167. It was further believed that the concept in the mind 
totally determined the extension of the term associated with it. A concept, in other words, was 
expected to “always provide a necessary and sufficient condition for [a given item to fall] into 
the extension of the term”168, and this implied that “sameness of intension entails sameness of 
extension”169. 
                                               
163
 Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996: 129). 
164
 Although he elsewhere uses the German term ‘Gedankenexperiment’. 
165
 Pessin and Goldberg (1996: xi). 
166
 According to Putnam, this view is “millennia-old” and can be traced back to the writings of Plato and Aristotle. 
See Pessin and Goldberg (1996: xv). 
167
 Putnam (1996 [1975]: 6). 
168
 Ibid (6).  
169
 Ibid (6). 
 51
On a sunny day, a dauntless knight from Harvard described a family of scenarios which were 
intended to show, amongst other things, that the received view rested ultimately on a false 
theory. This theory, in particular, relied on the two assumptions just recalled, maintaining that 
(1) “knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain psychological state”, 
and that (2) “the meaning of a term (in the sense of “intension”) determines its extension”170. An 
unavoidable consequence of the two joint assumptions was that mental state determines 
extension. As a matter of (logical) fact, if we grant the truth of the two, apparently quite plausible 
premises, according to which (1) the mental state of the speaker determines intension, and (2) 
intension determines extension (in the sense of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership in the extension), it follows, by modus ponens, that mental state determines 
extension.  
Finding this consequence utterly unpalatable, Putnam set out to show that the two premises of 
the above syllogism were in fact mutually inconsistent, that they could not both be true at the 
same time. To set the stage for (what he regarded as) the fatal blow, he reasoned as follows: if it 
is possible to show that two subjects can be in the same mental state “even though the extension 
of the term A in the idiolect of the one is different from the extension of A in the idiolect of the 
other”171, then the seemingly unassailable inference breaks down, and we are forced to give up, 
i.e. to acknowledge as false, at least one of the two premises. In order to do this, he resorted to 
the newly rediscovered Leibnizian notion of a possible world and gave birth to one of the most 
heuristically fruitful fictional entities philosophers have been grappling with in the last few 
decades: Twin Earth. The planet we are asked to imagine is “exactly like Earth”, but for one 
little, apparently harmless detail, consisting in the fact that on Twin Earth: 
 
“the liquid called “water” is not H 2 O but a different liquid whose chemical formula is very 
long and complicated. I shall abbreviate this chemical formula simply as XYZ. I shall 
suppose that XYZ is indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures and pressures. In 
particular, it tastes like water and it quenches thirst like water. Also, I shall suppose that 
the oceans and lakes and seas of Twin Earth contain XYZ and not water, that it rains XYZ 
on Twin Earth and not water, etc. 
If a spaceship from Earth ever visits Twin Earth, then the supposition at first will be that 
“water” has the same meaning on Earth and on Twin Earth. This supposition will be 
corrected when it is discovered that “water” on Twin Earth is XYZ, and the Earthian 
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spaceship will report somewhat as follows: “On Twin Earth, the word “water” means 
XYZ”172. 
 
The above scenario, according to many, has the power to elicit in us strong intuitions concerning 
the nature of meaning. In particular, as I said, it purports to show that it is possible for two 
speakers to be in the same mental or brain state, “neuron for neuron”173, and yet for the terms 
that they use to differ in extension. And since extension, according to Putnam, while not 
identifiable with, certainly contributes to the meaning of a term, it follows that knowing the 
meaning of a term cannot simply amount to being in a certain psychological or brain state. 
Meanings, according to Putnam, do not indeed exist “in quite the way we tend to think they 
do”174, in the sense that they do not seem to be, and therefore ought not to be construed as, 
private mental properties. Twin Earth examples, according to Putnam, enable us to realize that 
knowledge of meanings, contrary to the deeply rooted methodological solipsism of the previous 
tradition175, displays both social and environmental components. Such knowledge would not be 
possible for a thinker in isolation, but presupposes interactions with other language users, on the 
one hand, and with the world, on the other. In a nutshell, Putnam’s idea is the following: In order 
for us to mean x when we use the term “x” it is neither sufficient nor necessary to share certain 
mental images or brain states with other speakers. What is necessary is that the (particular) entity 
referred to by that term actually be an (instance of) x. And whether this is the case or not, 
depends ultimately on empirical research. “Cut the pie any way you like”, he famously 
concludes, ““meanings” just ain’t in the head”176. 
 
 
2.2.5 Justified true beliefs 
 
It is probably true that epistemology, as it has been written, has been mainly driven by “what 
may seem to be the purely argumentative power of counterexamples”177. Nonetheless, amongst 
these counterexamples, some have happened to enjoy a remarkably higher favor than others, and 
thereby immediately to acquire the status of paradigm instances. This is indeed undeniably the 
case of the two examples by means of which Edmund Gettier, in a famous three pages article 
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published in 1963, rejected a widely shared analysis of knowledge, the refutation of which, if we 
are to believe what we are told, “was accepted almost overnight by the community of analytic 
epistemologists”178. Whether the unusual success of Gettier’s cases directly contributed to, or 
was rather partly explained by, contemporary philosophers’ growing interest in thought-
experimental methods is perhaps an interesting matter for historians to settle. From the point of 
view of the present discussion anyways, Gettier’s counterexamples certainly represent a 
privileged case to end our short list of philosophical thought experiments with. In fact, some 
have recently gone as far as to maintain that “to determine whether Gettier’s thought 
experiments succeed is in effect to determine whether there can be successful thought 
experiments in philosophy”179. 
Borrowing terminology from James Robert Brown180, we might say that Gettier’s 
counterexamples constitute a clear-cut case of destructive thought experiment, in that they are 
not properly aimed at establishing a new definition181 of knowledge, but rather at rejecting a 
received and generally accepted one. According to the received view, which might be regarded 
as the standard analysis of knowledge up to Gettier’s paper, being a justified true belief is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for being knowledge. This widely shared tripartite analysis of 
knowledge, that is, holds that, in order for an epistemic agent S to know (i.e. to be in the relation 
of ‘knowing’ to) a proposition P, it is both necessary and sufficient that the three following 
conditions be satisfied: (1) P is true, (2) S believes that P, and (3) S is justified in believing that 
P. 
Despite the undeniably high plausibility of the above claim, Edmund Gettier thought otherwise. 
Being a justified true belief, according to him, although necessary, was not a sufficient condition 
for being knowledge. It seemed to him just as plausible, that is, that a person may be fully 
justified in believing something without thereby automatically being in the relation of ‘knowing’ 
to the object which she believed. The intuitive plausibility of a similar situation rested, according 
to Gettier, on the previous acceptance of two basic assumptions, which he seemed to take for 
granted, concerning the notion of “justification”. The only sense of “justification” in which a 
person’s justified belief is a necessary condition of his knowledge, according to the first 
assumption, is the sense in which someone can be justified in believing something false. 
Moreover, for any proposition P, according to the second assumption, “if S is justified in 
believing P and P entails Q and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, 
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then S is justified in believing Q”182. If one were willing to accept these two assumptions as 
obvious, maintained Gettier, then cases would be certainly possible in which a justified true 
belief intuitively would not seem to constitute knowledge. Applying the term ‘knowledge’ to 
such cases, to put it in Russell words, “would not accord with the way in which the word is 
commonly used”183. 
In order to show this, Gettier used two puzzling examples, which spawned one of the most hair-
splitting yet prolific epistemological debates in recent analytic philosophy. In the first example 
we are asked to consider the following possible set of circumstances. Two men named Smith and 
Jones have applied for the same job, and Smith has evidence for the following proposition: 
 
(a) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket184. 
 
Smith is further aware of the fact that (a) entails the following proposition: 
 
(b) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
 
As a consequence, accepting (b) on the grounds of (a), Smith is justified in believing that (b) is 
true. Suppose now that, unknown to Smith, he (Smith) is the one who has been selected for the 
job, and who further happens to have ten coins in his pocket. Were a similar situation to occur, 
the following three conditions, according to the two assumptions recalled above, would 
obviously be satisfied: (1) (b) is true, (2) Smith believes that (b) is true, (3) Smith is justified in 
believing that (b) is true. Unfortunately for the standard analysis, Gettier points out, despite the 
fulfilment of the three conditions, it is just as obvious that Smith cannot be said to know that (b) 
is true. 
The second example, presented here in a somewhat simplified version, requires us to consider a 
similar scenario. Our imaginary epistemological guinea pig, the highly respectable Mr. Smith, 
has again evidence for the following proposition: 
 
(a) Jones owns a Ford185. 
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At this point, a further acquaintance of Smith, Brown, enters the thought experimental scenario. 
In the absence of any evidence whatsoever concerning the current geographical location of 
Brown, Smith entertains in his mind the following proposition: 
 
(b) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. 
 
Smith is aware of the fact that (b) is entailed by (a) and, having inferred the former from the 
latter, is justified in believing that (b) is true. Suppose now again that as a matter of fact, and 
unbeknownst to the poor Smith, Jones does not own a Ford but drives a rented car and that 
Brown, “by sheer coincidence”, really happens to find himself in Barcelona. Even in this case 
then, the conditions required by the standard analysis would be certainly met, since: (1) (b) is 
true, (2) Smith believes that (b) is true, (3) Smith is justified in believing that (b) is true. 
Nonetheless, as in the previous example, despite the apparent plausibility of the standard 
analysis, we would not be willing to admit that Smith really knows that (b) is true. 
In both cases, it seems, Mr. Smith’s beliefs are in order, in that they are both arguably justified 
and true. And yet, as Gettier’s scenarios are intended to show, our intuitions are, at least prima 
facie, stubbornly reluctant to grant them the status of knowledge. Being a justified true belief 
therefore, concludes Gettier, contrary to what the standard tripartite analysis holds, is not a 
sufficient condition for being knowledge. Q. E. D. 
 
 
2.3 Intuitions we live by 
 
Towards the beginning of Saul Kripke’s epoch-making lectures on Naming and necessity we find 
the following Neo-Cartesian pronouncement: 
 
“Some philosophers think that something’s having intuitive content is very inconclusive 
evidence in favour of it. I think it is very heavy evidence in favor of anything, myself. I 
really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, 
ultimately speaking”186. 
 
Starting with Plato, intuitions have been typically appealed to by philosophers in developing 
their arguments. It seems indeed difficult to deny that, even if one were reluctant to grant them 
any evidential value or conclusive weight within philosophical debates, intuitions, as it has been 
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put, would certainly still constitute “the inevitable starting point of any intellectual inquiry”187. In 
virtue of this fact, some have moreover felt that our disagreements concerning both nature and 
epistemic authority of intuitions fundamentally reflect a struggle for the preservation of 
philosophy as an autonomous field of inquiry188. Be that as it may, these highly controversial 
epistemic sources have figured prominently in most contemporary analytic philosophers’ 
argumentative strategies and are therefore certainly worth a closer look at. 
Philosophical thought experiments, as the above examples show, rely heavily on intuitions and 
call therefore naturally for a careful discussion of both their nature and the limits of their proper 
use. In fact, insofar as skepticism about thought experiments can arguably be taken to rest 
ultimately on skepticism about certain purportedly wrongheaded uses of intuitions, attempted 
general assessments of the proper epistemic status of thought-experimentally generated beliefs 
will hinge largely on a brief preliminary look at the current debate concerning the use of 
intuitions in philosophical methodology. 
A striking feature of the latter debate is that, while almost every philosopher seems willing to 
grant intuitions some role or other in the process of generating, supporting, or updating our 
beliefs, a remarkable amount of disagreement still reigns over their specific nature. Granted 
indeed that intuitions are psychological states, one may want to ask, what kind of psychological 
states are they? On a first approximation, a general yet very plausible answer to this question 
might go as follows: Intuitions are doxastic states not formed on the basis of any explicit (i.e. 
conscious) reasoning process; they are opinions we find ourselves willing to assent to, while 
unable to support our assent by means of any explicit argument189. 
Moreover, while accepting this formulation as fundamentally correct, one might also want to 
raise questions concerning the proper phenomenology of such doxastic states. In order to push 
the inquiry further, that is, one might profitably ask questions such as: What are the salient 
features (if any) which allow us to distinguish intuitions from other doxastic states? Or else, 
what are the possible contents of an intuition, i.e., roughly, what kinds of things can we have 
intuitions about? A casual use of the term may indeed bring one to conflate intuitions with other 
similar doxastic states, or worst suggest the idea that the range of possible contents of an 
intuition may encompass just about anything. Having come to grips with similar questions, 
different authors have proposed several sensibly divergent accounts of the notion of intuition 
they hold to be most relevant to philosophical theorizing. The account provided by George 
Bealer, being one of the most thorough and insightful attempts at describing intuitions proper 
phenomenology, is the one we will focus on in what follows. 
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Bealer construes intuitions as intellectual seemings. As such, intuitions would be opposed to 
sensory, introspective, or imaginative seemings, which he refers to as experiential. “For you to 
have an intuition that A”, Bealer writes, “is just for it to seem to you that A”190. Intellectual and 
experiential seemings, according to his view, differ markedly in phenomenology, insofar as their 
contents cannot overlap. Drawing on Descartes’ famous example, Bealer maintains that, while it 
is possible for a subject to “intuit” the existence of a chiliagon, the very existence of the same 
polygon cannot be “imagined”191. These intellectual seemings, in his view, can further be divided 
into two subclasses, namely physical intuitions, which would typically not present themselves as 
necessary, and rational intuitions, which would. Accordingly, he offers the following, tentative, 
analysis of rational intuitions: “necessarily, if x intuits that P, it seems to x that P, and that 
necessarily P”192. 
Bealer, in particular, regards intuition as differing substantially from belief. In fact, he maintains, 
contrary to intuition, this last propositional attitude is usually taken to be highly “plastic”. The 
strength, that is, with which a particular belief is held, is liable to be sensibly increased or 
diminished by various circumstances193. Even in this case, therefore, each state could occur 
without the other. One could, for instance, “believe” but not “intuit” that Rome is the capital of 
Italy or that a certain mathematical theorem holds, just as one could “intuit” but not “believe” the 
naïve comprehension axiom of set theory194. A further, illuminating example appeals to a well 
known law of propositional calculus: “when you first consider one of De Morgan’s laws, often it 
neither seems true nor seems false; after a moment’s reflection, however, something happens: it 
now just seems true”195. Intuition, in other words, manifestly survives grounded contrary belief, 
and this is exactly the respect under which, according to Bealer, its phenomenology can be 
regarded as paralleling that of a common sensorial kind of experiential seemings, namely 
perceptual illusions. The analogy proposed in this case, as one might expect, is that with the 
famous Müller-Lyer illusion, where, in Bealer’s words, “it still seems to me that one of the two 
arrows is longer than the other […] despite the fact that I do not believe that one of the two 
arrows is longer (because I have measured them)”196. 
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Bealer further holds intuition to differ markedly from a spontaneous (i.e. unprompted) 
inclination to believe. This phenomenological difference, in his view, is a consequence of fact 
that intuitions, contrary to dispositional states such as inclinations, would be intrinsically 
episodic. “As I am writing this”, Bealer points out, “I have spontaneous inclinations to believe 
countless things about, say, numbers. But I am having no intuition about numbers”197. 
A similar example, in his view, would also exclude the possibility of reducing intuitions to a 
raising to consciousness of some nonconscious background beliefs198. While appealing to 
unconscious background beliefs might indeed help explaining conscious belief, the same 
explanatory pattern, in Bealer’s view, would not do the job in the case intuitions as so far 
construed. The reason is that, on many occasions, the conscious beliefs associated to the intuition 
would differ from it in truth value. In order to show this, Bealer invites us to reflect upon a 
situation in which a subject is asked whether the naïve comprehension axiom and the rules of 
classical logic both hold. Confronted by such question the subject would have the conscious 
belief that that they do not both hold, while having the intuition that they do. Moreover, the same 
reductionist proposal, according to Bealer, would fall short of accounting for intuitions 
concerning novel questions, in the case of which there simply are no background beliefs one 
could appeal to199. 
To sum up then, based on their peculiar phenomenology, rational intuitions, according to Bealer, 
ought to be carefully distinguished from: experiential seemings, beliefs, inclinations to believe, 
and raising to consciousness of nonconscious background beliefs. His proposal is therefore to 
construe intuition as a “sui generis propositional attitude”200, more specifically a sui generis, 
irreducible propositional attitude that occurs episodically”201. 
 
 
2.4 Conceptual analysis 
 
The use of intuitions about possible cases is generally held to be deeply entrenched in a 
traditionally practiced philosophical activity, namely conceptual analysis. In fact, it is precisely 
because of its systematic reliance on this highly controversial epistemic source, that conceptual 
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analysis has come to be regarded as a canonical example of intuition-based methodology. Before 
taking a closer look at its typical functioning, it is worth pointing out that conceptual analysis 
presupposes a specific view on the internal structure of concepts, often referred to as classical 
theory of concepts. According to this view, concepts in general would possess a specifiable 
definitional structure, i.e. they would be composed of simpler concepts which express the 
necessary and sufficient conditions a particular object has to satisfy in order to fall under a given 
concept202. 
The generally acknowledged aim of conceptual analysis is that of determining the essential 
properties of some abstract notion F, such as ‘knowledge’, ‘mind’, or ‘meaning’ for instance. 
Essential properties, on a first, rough approximation, can be understood as those properties in 
virtue of which an F is what it is. In order to identify such properties, philosophers, from 
Socrates on, have typically started by looking for definitions. Giving a definition of F, according 
to the classical theory of concepts recalled above, amounts to providing a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions a particular object a has to satisfy in order to be rightfully considered an 
instance of F. Once the definition is given, philosophers will typically start looking for 
counterexamples to it.  
These counterexamples will be of two general kinds, corresponding to the two ways in which a 
definition may go wrong. One could, that is, either provide an example of a particular object 
which does satisfy the conditions provided by the definition, but which one would be unwilling 
to count as an instance of F, or one could provide an example of a particular object which does 
not satisfy those conditions, but which one would nonetheless be willing to count as an instance 
of F. While in the former case the conditions posited by the definition would be shown to be not 
sufficient, in the latter case they would be shown to be not necessary for an item a to be 
rightfully considered an instance of F. Once a definition is thus undermined by means of specific 
counterexamples, a new definition will be usually looked for, which is able to account for those 
counterexamples. The provisional goal of this open-ended dialectical process is that of reaching 
what we might call a stable definition, i.e a definition which appears to lack counterexamples. 
It is not hard to see that the practice sketched above, in the process of finding counterexamples to 
given definitions, relies heavily on intuitions concerning the applicability of specific terms (those 
terms, namely, whose referents are the objects appealed to in the counterexamples) to possible 
scenarios. A fundamental part of conceptual analysis, that is, to put it in familiar jargon, turns on 
‘what one would (or should) say’ if something were the case203. 
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A definition then, according to what we said so far, is usually accepted or rejected depending on 
whether it captures or fails to capture our conceptual or linguistic insights concerning the matter 
at issue. It is indeed a widely shared opinion amongst philosophers that definitions ought to be 
constantly revised in the light of intuitive judgements. According to many, though, this ongoing 
revision cannot just be a matter of testing our concepts, and the theories they stem from, against 
our intuitions, but should rather run in both directions. Conceptual analysis, in their view, should 
therefore be regarded, and carried out as a continuous process whose two poles would be 
concepts or theories, on the one hand, and intuitions, on the other.  
Adapting to the case of concepts Nelson Goodman’s famous account of justification in terms of 
reflective equilibrium amongst beliefs, I propose to describe this process as follows: 
 
A definition should be revised if it does not account for an intuition we are unwilling to 
neglect; an intuition should be neglected if it is not captured by a definition we are 
unwilling to revise204. 
 
It is important for our purposes to observe that, contrary to traditional conceptual analysis, this 
further development seems to presuppose a different view of the internal structure of concepts, 
often referred to as theory theory of concepts. According to this view, “concepts stand in a 
relation to one another in the same way as the terms of a scientific theory and […] categorization 
is a process that strongly resembles scientific theorizing”205. This way of thinking about 
concepts, as I would like to suggest, is often implicit in much theorizing on the epistemic role of 
intuitions206 and plays a fundamental role in philosophical thought experiments. 
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2.5 The tribunal of experience 
 
Gary Gutting has recently maintained that: “a modus tollens argument based on an utterly 
obvious counterexample is decisive”207. This bold claim immediately raises a problem 
concerning the epistemic status of our intuitions, which could be formulated roughly as follows: 
how can we decide whether a certain counterexample’s being obvious to anyone can be taken to 
provide decisive evidence for anything?  
General skepticism about the use of intuitions in philosophical theorizing is not uncommon 
amongst philosophers. Hypothetical scenarios such as the ones we have been considering above 
naturally (and reasonably, I believe) invite skepticism. While some authors, on the one hand, 
seem willing to grant to thought experiments the power to confer justification on philosophical 
beliefs, other authors, on the other, regard the use of such argumentative strategies as a rather 
persuasive invitation to banish intuitions from our philosophical inquiries once and for all. Given 
the often wildly far-fetched nature of the fictional scenarios appealed to by thought experiments, 
some have indeed reasoned, why should we regard the intuitions elicited by them as 
epistemically warranted judgements?  
Over the last century, thinkers of a more or less scientistic bent, have often made a point of 
signalling the potential deceptiveness of our intuitions. While reflecting on the ultimate epistemic 
foundations of our knowledge of the external world, for instance, Bertrand Russell voiced his 
concerns in the following words: 
 
“It is true that intuition has a convincingness which is lacking to intellect: while it is 
present, it is almost impossible to doubt its truth. But if it should appear, on examination, 
to be at least as fallible as intellect, its greater subjective certainty becomes a demerit, 
making it only the more irresistibly deceptive”208. 
 
As a matter of fact, examples of the potential deceptiveness of empirical intuitions abound. A 
simple one is apparently to be found in one of the arguments traditionally used by Aristotelians 
to prove that the earth was at rest209. Their argument can be cast into the form of a counterfactual 
conditional as follows: 
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If the earth rotated from west to east, then unattached objects (e.g. clouds) should move 
from east to west, (or, alternatively, …then a rock dropped from a tower would land west 
of the tower). 
 
According to the same Aristotelians, this would be clearly shown by a simple thought 
experiment. It is evident, so the story goes, that a rock dropped from the mast of a moving ship 
would land at the rear of the ship. Thinking that it wouldn’t would indeed be absurd. As it 
happened, subsequent experiments proved that the ‘evident’ fact did not occur at all, and this 
seems to teach a disturbing lesson about empirical intuitions which is somehow reminiscent of 
Russell’s concerns, namely that their alleged obviousness, at times, can prevent people from 
putting them to the test!  
Why should rational intuitions, i.e. intuitions about abstract matters of the sort described by 
Bealer, fare any better? With respect to  the study of meaning, for instance, some have very 
reasonably held that “just as our ordinary intuitions about physics provide only a rudimentary 
starting point for the creation of physical laws […] the fact that our ordinary understanding of 
the mind presupposes an externalist, supra-individual semantics says very little about whether an 
externalist semantics is the best choice for a theory of meaning”210. 
Warnings of this sort, moreover, have usually pointed to the fact that most intuitions are likely to 
display several rather unwelcome epistemic shortcomings, which have usually been held 
responsible for rendering their deliverances intolerably prone to error. Intuitions, in particular, 
have typically been regarded as neither reflectively stable, nor universally shared. While indeed, 
on the one hand, intuitive beliefs generally do not outlive more careful rational scrutiny, 
empirical research, on the other, might end up showing that epistemic agents belonging to 
different cultural groups (or to the same cultural community, for that matter) do not in fact share 
the same intuitions211. For this reason, many have deemed intuitions to be excessively context-
sensitive, too much dependent, that is, on a number of psychological or cultural factors. Others 
have seen intuitions as unconsciously and hence unavoidably theory-driven. A change in the 
privileged theoretical framework, according to this line of reasoning, would be very likely to 
produce markedly different intuitions on the very same subject matter. Similar drawbacks have 
contributed to depict intuitions as dangerously unreliable sources of knowledge. 
These concerns have found strong support, in recent years, in the advancement of cognitive 
science. As a matter of fact, over the last three or four decades, the epistemic value of intuition-
based philosophical methodologies has been radically questioned on strictly empirical grounds. 
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A powerful case has indeed recently been made, according to which a growing corpus of 
empirical findings concerning the nature of human concepts and categorization judgements 
would cast serious doubts on the cognitive value of a methodology which, as we have seen, has 
traditionally played a crucial role in philosophical theorizing, namely conceptual analysis212. A 
troublesome diagnosis has accordingly been formulated, according to which “Western analytic 
philosophy is, in many respects, undergoing a crisis where there is considerable urgency and 
anxiety regarding the status of intuitive analysis”213. 
A long tradition in Western philosophy has thought of categories as logical entities, membership 
to which has been usually taken to be, as it has been put, “a digital, all-or-none phenomenon”214. 
Several authors, starting from the seventies, have argued that some natural categories would be 
best thought of as possessing rather an analog structure215. Elaborating on this view, Eleanor 
Rosch has proposed to think of categories as internally structured into prototype and 
nonprototype members, reflecting an order that ranges from better to poorer examples of a given 
category. She exemplifies thus the psychological data which her research tries to account for: 
“As speakers of our language and members of our culture, we know that a chair is a more 
reasonable exemplar of the category furniture than a radio”216. Empirical research, rather than a 
priori speculation is obviously needed in order to specify the principles of learning and 
information processing which determine the formation of prototypes. Nonetheless, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s considerations concerning the structure of concepts are acknowledged by Rosh as 
the immediate philosophical antecedent of such empirical work217.  
Wittgenstein’s general idea was that, in order for a word to be consistently used in a language, its 
referents need not possess common elements, but rather display what he called a family 
resemblance. This kind of relation can be profitably understood as a set of items of the form: ab, 
bc, cd, de. The feature of this set which is relevant to our discussion, according to Eleanor Rosh 
and Carolyn Mervis, would be that: “each item has at least one, and probably several, elements 
in common with one or more other items, but no, or few, elements are common to all items”218. 
The same authors take their work to provide an empirical foundation for Wittgenstein’s original 
idea, insofar as their research would reveal that “subjects can reliably rate the extent to which a 
member of a category fits their idea or image of the meaning of the category name […] and such 
ratings predict performance in a number of tasks”219. 
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Some have felt that the story sketched above would have, if true, very heavy consequences for 
conceptual analysis as traditionally practiced. The same empirical results, according to their line 
of reasoning, would explain in particular why definitional analyses of concepts are typically very 
controversial. In fact, according to the prototype theory, and contrary to the classical view, the 
way in which we represent concepts would simply lack a clear-cut definitional structure, but 
would rather display a prototypical and hence probabilistic one220. If this were indeed the case, 
then any attempt at specifying the essential properties of an abstract notion F in terms of a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that an object a has to satisfy in order to be a member of F 
would be radically undermined, insofar as those sets of necessary and sufficient conditions will 
never be able to capture the full range of our intuitions, and hence never become reflectively 
stable, i.e. immune to further counterexamples.  
According to William Ramsey221, for instance, the abundant use of intuitive judgements would 
reveal that conceptual analysis as practiced by philosophers is committed to specific, but of 
course not empirically founded, assumptions concerning the nature of our cognitive system. 
These assumptions would stem, in his view, from a widely, yet wrongly shared folk-theoretical 
story about the way in which human beings represent concepts, namely the classical view of 
concepts recalled above. A fundamental tenet of this view, according to Ramsey, would indeed 
be an empirically unjustified reliance on intuition, construed as a faculty capable of providing 
access to some sort of tacit knowledge concerning the essence of abstract notions and their 
intrinsic structure. 
 
 
2.6 Questioning the verdict 
 
In the light of all this, other philosophers have responded by pointing out that a careful 
assessment of the general theoretical relevance of empirical findings of any kind for 
philosophical methodology cannot avoid taking into account the normative role traditionally 
assigned by philosophers to their epistemological endeavours. Overlooking the normative and 
evaluative aspects of philosophical inquiry, in their view, would run the obvious risk of falling 
pray to a gross and well known psychologistic fallacy.  
Basic normative considerations, as a matter of fact, seem to suggest that what are usually 
referred to as typicality or prototype effects of our categorization judgements, what we might call 
the degree of F-ness of an F, for instance, are not immediately relevant to the “real nature” of an 
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F. Conceptual analysis, as it has been frequently argued, would not be after the former, but rather 
after the latter. From a normative point of view, in other words, the position of someone claiming 
that the classical view of concepts could be taken as “a possible underlying motivation”222 for 
practicing conceptual analysis seems just wrong. The claim, it might be plausibly maintained, 
from a perhaps less generous point of view, just trades on the conflation between psychological 
and logical aspects of our cognitive lives. How could the actual way in which humans represent 
concepts, one could in fact reasonably argue, possibly bear on conceptual analysis? While indeed 
the former is a purely descriptive business, the latter, once again, thinks rather of itself as a 
strictly normative one223. 
An early reaction along these lines has been thoroughly articulated in a seminal article by 
Georges Rey224, whose central aim was not that of evaluating the empirical results produced by 
Eleanor Rosch and her associates225, but rather to provide a general assessment of the relevance 
of those results for the philosophical study of concepts.  
Traditionally, observes Rey, concepts have been held to perform several different functions 
within human cognition beyond pure categorization, none of which would have been properly 
addressed by the afore mentioned empirical findings. Concepts, for instance, would perform 
what he calls a stability function with respect to our ordinary explanations of behaviour, in that 
they provide “the links between different cognitive states that are ‘about the same thing’”226. 
They would further perform, in his view, fundamental metaphysical and epistemological 
functions in that they provide the basis for claims about universals, on the one hand, and about a 
priori knowledge, on the other.  
The incapability of accounting for these functions, according to Rey, would be due to the fact 
that the theory of concepts developed by cognitive psychologists “hopelessly confuses 
metaphysical issues of conceptual identity with (roughly speaking) epistemological issues of 
conceptual access”227. Cognitive scientist, in Rey’s view, just as the logical positivists before 
them, would have illegitimately conflated metaphysics with epistemology228. Their theory of 
concepts, as a consequence, while certainly revealing important psychological features of 
people’s access to their system of beliefs, would do little or nothing to explain either a concept’s 
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identity conditions, or the conditions of its competent use229. As a matter of fact, he suggests, a 
satisfying account of the these conditions “may not be a piece of psychology at all”230. 
An implicit assumption of the work in cognitive science, Rey observes further, holds that 
“having a concept consists in knowing the defining conditions”231. Contrary to this assumption, 
he maintains, “recent” work in philosophy of language, due mainly to Hilary Putnam and Saul 
Kripke, has abundantly showed that competent use of a concept by a member of a linguistic 
community and knowledge of its correct definition ought to be thought of and treated as different 
cognitive performances. Appealing to our ordinary linguistic intuitions concerning proper names 
and natural kind terms, in particular, these authors would have showed that “whether or not there 
actually are defining conditions, competent users of a concept may still not know them”232. The 
arguments of these philosophers would indeed be precisely aimed at challenging the view “that 
the proper definition of a term need play some epistemological role”233. This, in particular, is the 
reason why, in his view, producing empirical evidence of the fact that competent users of 
concepts might not be able to provide defining conditions for them, does not amount to rejecting, 
or undermining the classical view of concepts. Such evidence, he maintains, might equally well 
be explained by acknowledging that “while at least many such natural kind terms do in fact have 
definitions, competent users may simply be ignorant of what they might be”234. 
Sharing similar concerns, George Bealer has more recently championed a form of moderate 
rationalism235, perhaps placing a stronger emphasis on modal considerations. Central questions 
of philosophy, according to Bealer, can, in principle, be answered without relying on the results 
of the empirical sciences236. This is due to the fact that the “central questions” of philosophy, in 
his view, would be questions concerning “the nature of x”, and the answers to these questions, in 
order to be legitimately considered such, must enjoy the status of necessity. While inquiring into 
things such as the nature of x, maintains indeed Bealer, “philosophers do not want to know what 
those things just happen to be, but rather what those things must be, what they are in a strong 
sense”237. The epistemic status of conceptual analysis, in his view, would be on a par, for 
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instance, with the mathematical investigation of computability in the 1930’s238. Accordingly, he 
summarizes his view in what he calls the autonomy of philosophy thesis, which he expresses in 
the following terms: 
 
“Among the central questions of philosophy that can be answered by one standard 
theoretical means or another, most can in principle be answered by philosophical 
investigation and argument without relying substantively on the sciences”239. 
 
Insofar as the above thesis is a modal claim, maintains Bealer, it constitutes a “cognitive 
ideal”240. It follows that, in order to reject it, one must show that the sort of knowledge it appeals 
to is not only not available to humans, but strictly speaking impossible. His position seems 
therefore to be in principle unassailable by empirical means. In particular, he maintains, despite 
the fact that “many philosophers enjoy the pastime of “intuition bashing””241 on the basis of the 
empirical findings of cognitive psychologists, rational intuitions, construed as seemings, while 
certainly corrigible, remain the proper epistemic source of our standard justificatory procedure 
in all a priori disciplines242. 
 
 
2.7 Naturalizing intuitions 
 
As it stands, the debate that we have been outlining so far seems to suggest that the real 
challenge that philosophical methodology has to face is that of taking into serious account the 
growing corpus of empirical data coming from cognitive science, while at the same time 
preserving its normative role. Some have indeed lamented that even long after the experimental 
findings recalled above have been disclosed “there has been surprisingly little effort […] to 
articulate a plausible method for philosophical inquiry that does not run foul of current empirical 
research”243. Methodological traditionalists and cognitive scientists, in other words, while 
investigating the same object, namely human cognition, run the serious risk of just talking past 
each other. This outcome, I believe, can and should be avoided, and a natural way to do this 
would certainly be that of inquiring into the possibility of there being interesting links between 
normative and descriptive aspects of the study of human cognition. 
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In this regard, the central aim of Philip Kitcher’s 1992 seminal paper on epistemological 
naturalism was precisely that of exploring “the feasibility of preserving the normative enterprise 
within a naturalist framework”244. Starting from the work of Frege, the two central tenets of 
philosophical antinaturalism have notoriously been anti-psychologism, on the one hand, and the 
belief in the existence of a class of a priori truths, on the other. Kitcher’s brand of naturalism, 
which he calls traditional naturalism, occupies an “uncomfortable middle ground”245 in that it 
aims at rejecting both, while at the same time preserving the normative project of traditional 
epistemology.  
Playing a normative function, in his view, would amount to achieving corrigible formulations of 
the goals of our cognitive enterprise, and corrigible accounts of the strategies for achieving those 
goals246. This requires, in particular, making room for psychology within epistemological 
theorizing. Insofar as human beings are the products of a long evolutionary process, Kitcher 
maintains indeed, their psychological capacities are highly relevant to the study of human 
knowledge. It is for this reason that prescriptions for thought, in his view, should be grounded 
“in facts about how systems like us could attain our epistemic goals in a world like ours”247. 
It is important for our present purposes to observe that, in Kitcher’s view, the reintroduction of 
psychology into epistemology would be reflected by the passage from the first to the second of 
two different strategies which have been adopted in order to tackle the problem raised by 
Gettier’s much celebrated thought experiment. Central to the first strategy, according to his view, 
would be the question as to which logical conditions a belief has to satisfy in order to avoid 
Gettier-like counterexamples, while central to the second would rather be the question as to 
which belief-generating processes a belief has to originate from in order to avoid those 
counterexamples. It cannot go unnoticed that a similar change of strategy presupposes a 
fundamental transition from a foundationalist approach to epistemology to a reliabilist one. This 
transition, according to some, is a fair price to be paid in order to ‘make room for psychology’. 
Moving from a similar reliabilist approach to justification, for instance, Hilary Kornblith has 
been trying to embed an account of the role of intuition in philosophical inquiry within a purely 
naturalistic framework248. Insofar as epistemology, in his view, is to be seen as a continuous with 
the empirical sciences, the practice of appealing to intuitions in “constructing, shaping, and 
refining […] philosophical views”249 can and should be accounted for in purely naturalistic 
terms. Epistemology, in particular, according to Kornblith, would not be some kind of ordinary 
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language analysis, but the investigation of a certain mind-independent natural phenomenon 
called ‘knowledge’, single cases of which, displaying a high degree of theoretical unity, allow us 
to treat it as a natural kind. It is precisely for this reason, he maintains, that by appealing to our 
intuitions about knowledge we are not inquiring into the nature of same shared yet mind-
dependent concept, but we rather “make salient”250 certain instances of the phenomenon we are 
investigating.  
In order to clarify his view, Kornblith appeals to the following analogy. “What we 
[epistemologists] are doing”, he writes, “is much like the rock collector who gathers samples of 
some interesting kind of stone for the purpose of figuring out what it is that the samples have in 
common”251. What we are trying to determine, that is, are the specific traits which confer 
theoretical unity to the natural kind. Philosophical inquiry, in other words, would be on a par 
with scientific investigation of natural kinds. 
Once the main task of epistemology is framed in similar terms, Kornblith maintains, the proper 
role of intuition can readily be discerned. “The examples that prompt our intuitions”, he writes, 
“are merely obvious cases of the phenomenon under study”252. Their obviousness resides solely 
in the wide agreement that is to be found among the beliefs generated by those intuitions, and 
such agreement, in his view, has nothing to do with a priority, but is as a posteriori as the 
judgements of any ‘rock collector’ can be. Such intuitions therefore, according to Kornblith, 
would not only be corrigible but largely theory-dependent. This implies, in particular, that the 
intuitive judgements formulated at early stages of the investigation would carry less epistemic 
weight. Their reliability, in his view, will be most likely to increase as the privileged background 
theory progresses, thereby deepening our understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. 
This entitles him to subscribe to the following maxim: “The greater one’s theoretical 
understanding, the less weight one may assign to untutored judgement”253. This is why, in 
particular, as the scope of our theories expands, “old intuitions give way to well-integrated 
theoretical judgements, and, in addition, to new intuitions about matters not yet fully captured in 
explicit theory”254. 
While sharing his reliabilist approach to epistemology, some philosophers have found 
Kornblith’s account not entirely satisfying. Alvin Goldman, for instance, has recently proposed a 
naturalistic account of the philosophical use of intuitions which, while rejecting as wrongheaded 
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Kornblith’s appeal to natural kinds, favours an approach that I consider interesting in its own 
right and find therefore worth mentioning255.  
Goldman’s general approach to the matter is apparently very simple: we cannot even start 
assessing the epistemic reliability of philosophical intuitions, he maintains, until we decide what 
the proper targets of philosophical analysis are. This is due to the fact that intuitions will most 
likely turn out to be a reliable or unreliable epistemic source depending on how we construe the 
proper target of philosophical inquiry. That is to say that, trivially, we cannot decide whether a 
given intuition constitutes a piece of evidence, if we haven’t previously decided what that 
intuition is supposed to be evidence for. The targets of philosophical analysis, Goldman 
observes, have been alternatively construed by different philosophers as: 
 
1. Platonic forms 
2. Natural kinds 
3. Concepts 1 (in the Fregean sense) 
4. Concepts 2 (in the psychological, personal sense) 
5. Concepts 3 (shared concepts 2 )256. 
 
According to Goldman, the first stage of philosophical inquiry consists in the study of 
commonsense or folk concepts257. As a consequence, the way in which philosophical analysis is 
standardly practiced would reveal that it is concerned uniquely with concepts 2 , i.e. with private 
mental representations, or concepts in the psychological, personal sense. Once the target of 
philosophical inquiry is thus properly construed, he maintains, intuitions become again an 
evidential source worth appealing to258, and an epistemic agent can rightfully be said to intuit 
that a case a is or isn’t an instance of concept F (or that a concept F applies or fails to apply to 
case a).  
In order to clarify the nature of the evidential relation which links, in his view, a single intuition 
to the concept it is evidence for, Goldman distinguishes between what he calls constitutive and 
non-constitutive groundings of an evidential relation. An example of constitutive grounding 
would be provided by the idealist doctrine usually referred to as phenomenalism. According to 
this doctrine, as it is well known, the evidential status of appearances is grounded in the 
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constitution of physical objects, insofar as “what it is to be a physical object of a certain sort is 
that suitably situated subjects will experience perceptual appearances of an appropriate kind”259. 
While rejecting phenomenalism, Goldman holds that the evidential status of the intuitions by 
means of which an epistemic agent applies a concept F to a case a is grounded in the concept 
itself. “It’s part of the nature of concepts (in the personal psychological sense)”, he writes, “that 
possessing a concept tends to give rise to beliefs and intuitions that accord with the contents of 
the concept”260.  
This does not imply, in his view, that application intuitions of this sort should be regarded as 
infallible. An epistemic agent might for instance be misinformed or insufficiently informed about 
a case a, or act on the basis of a false theory concerning concept F261, and similar circumstances 
might well affect the correctness of his corresponding intuitions. This, in particular, would be the 
reason why philosophers usually prefer carefully stipulated examples and try to avoid appealing 
to intuitions that are clearly influenced by a theory of the target concept. 
The two main advantages of Goldman’s account, explicitly recognized by the author, are 
certainly worth signalling. A standard line of skepticism toward the philosophical use of 
intuitions, as Goldman points out, draws on the fact that different people might have conflicting 
intuitions about specific cases. His account blocks this line of criticism, insofar as, for obvious 
reasons, interpersonal variation ceases to undermine the reliability of intuitions. Moreover, once 
the subject matter of philosophical inquiry ceases to be a mind-independent entity, such as 
Platonic forms, natural kinds, or concepts in the Fregean sense, the causal links between 
intuitions and target concepts become intelligible again and worth investigating, thereby 
guaranteeing the possibility of placing philosophical analysis within a wholly naturalistic 
framework. 
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3. Epistemological considerations 
 
 
 
3.1 On what there might be 
 
One of the most intriguing features of our species, I believe, is that it can be credited with a 
remarkable ability to transcend the actual in thought by reflecting on, or else mentally 
entertaining, counterfactual state of affairs. On a first, rough, approximation, a counterfactual 
state of affairs can be profitably understood for our present purposes as a mental representation 
of a non-actual way in which the world has been, is, or will be. Besides being able to reflect on 
similar scenarios, moreover, we display a natural tendency toward formulating judgements 
concerning the possible consequences of similar scenarios. 
At the moment, for instance, I am sitting in front of my computer, in Pesaro, writing about 
thought experiments and sipping from a cup of green tea, but I can easily picture myself strolling 
about the winding little alleys of Urbino with my friend Claudio, smoking a cigar, and reasoning 
about the several different ways in which we could have missed to be friends. If in an early 
afternoon of a windy New York autumn, for instance, I had not entered a symbolic logic class 
held in one of the austere buildings of Columbia university, I would have not had the pleasure of 
making his acquaintance. At the same time though, I might reason further, my not entering that 
classroom on that specific afternoon, certainly could not have prevented me from meeting 
Claudio on some other departmental or more mundane occasion. 
Examples similar to the above, I believe, drove the American philosopher Roderick Chisholm to 
formulate the following epistemological consideration: 
 
“We seem to have knowledge of what might have happened, of what would happen if 
certain conditions were realized, of what tendencies, faculties, or potentialities and object 
could manifest in suitable environments. And this, most of us would be inclined to say, is 
valid and significant, even though the possible events to which it seems to pertain may 
never become actual”262. 
 
Our ability to produce similar representations, it seems, appears quite early in our developmental 
history, to the point that it has been used by cognitive scientists in order to investigate the way in 
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which young children acquire causal knowledge263. As a matter of fact, it seems difficult to deny 
that this highly creative mental skill plays a fundamental role in our explanatory abilities in 
general. Our ability to account for the occurring a given phaenomenon, it can indeed be argued, 
seems to be largely dependent on a corresponding capacity to produce and mentally manipulate 
relevant counterfactual scenarios involving physical, biological, or psychological variables.  
“If that stupid tree had moved out of the way”, I might exclaim after a car accident, “I would not 
have crashed my new Lamborghini!”; “if there had not been so much abuse of psychotropic 
substances during the seventies”, some hard-headed philosopher of science might lament, “there 
would not be so many modal realists around today!”; “if you had made different encounters in 
your life”, I might tell Claudio, “you would not now think of yourself as an ontologist!”. 
Indeed, if we envisioned scientific abstraction in general as instantiating similar patterns of 
counterfactual reasoning (as in asking, for instance, what would happen to a body if it were to 
move along a frictionless plane), I don’t think it would be an exaggeration to maintain that the 
afore mentioned human ability fuels the engine of most human discovery. 
As I hope the examples considered in the previous chapters have contributed to make clear, all 
thought-experimental thinking exploits this general ability to contemplate counterfactual 
scenarios and to make judgements concerning their most likely or unlikely consequences. As a 
matter of fact, I take the raison d’être of every thought experiment to lay in the fairly common 
pre-theoretical acknowledgement of the fact that reflecting on counterfactual scenarios has often 
proved capable of enhancing our understanding of reality in a way that would not have been 
possible had we confined our reflection to the actual world only. For this reason, I think that 
thought experiments are best seen as a sort of epistemic tools by means of which we investigate a 
realm of possibilities in order to assess truths concerning, or to test our beliefs about, what is 
actual. 
In the present chapter I will focus on philosophical thought experiments. “Philosophers”, it has 
been written, “characteristically ask not just whether things are some way but whether they 
could have been otherwise”264. As a matter of fact philosophical thought experiments present 
themselves as inherently modal ways of reasoning, which purport to give us access to some kind 
of modal truths. While in fact inspecting the world tells us what is the case, the more or less 
bizarre counterfactual scenarios evoked by thought experiments, as we have seen, purport to tell 
us something about what might or must be the case. It seems therefore natural to expect that a 
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critical assessment of their powers and limits will be largely dependent on a previous assessment 
of the various different kinds of possibilities that thought experiments invite us to consider. 
According to a widely agreed upon standard definition, the modality of a sentence S is the way in 
which its truth value holds. Starting at least from Aristotle265, we regard a given proposition as 
necessary if it must be true, and as possible if it might be true. Whenever we modalize, that is, we 
make a judgement or entertain a thought concerning the way in which a certain proposition holds 
or a certain state of affairs obtains. I think it is important to realize that, whenever we thus try to 
assess the modal status of a proposition, we do so by more or less consciously appealing to other 
propositions with respect to which we deem that proposition to be necessary or possible. 
Possibility and necessity, in other words, are normally understood as essentially relative notions. 
We seem to have a pre-theoretical understanding of this fact, which appears to be deeply rooted 
in our familiarity with natural language.  
This is not an isolated phenomenon. A similar one is observable in the way in which we use 
quantifiers in ordinary discourse. Every competent user of a natural language, that is, shows an 
intuitive understanding of the fact that quantifiers rarely occur unrestricted in human discourse 
and that their scopes normally depend on the context of utterance of the sentences within which 
they appear. When confronted with sentences which display an identical syntactical form, such 
as, for instance, ‘there is no God’ and ‘there is no beer’, we more or less consciously 
accommodate to the relevant scope of the quantifier at hand. 
Something similar, as I am trying to argue, holds in the case of ordinary modal thought and talk. 
Suppose, for instance, that some crazy philosopher told us that it is possible that the brain of a 
man be transplanted overnight into the skull of another man, or that, for all we know, it is 
possible for any of us to have a doppelgänger in a world spatio-temporally inaccessible from our 
own, or else that, according to the way in which we use the verb ‘know’, it is possible for an 
epistemic agent to be justified in believing something true without thereby knowing it. When 
confronted with similar situations, I believe, our normal reaction would be a demand for 
clarification, which we would presumably express by uttering the words: “What do you mean by 
‘possible’?” Or similar words to the same effect. 
A way to approach the same matter from a somehow different angle is the following. Suppose 
that we found ourselves at the philosophy department of the University of Urbino and we were 
asked to assess the truth or falsity of the two intentionally ambiguous following claims, 
concerning the usual hero of our examples: 
 
(1) Claudio cannot have travelled from Empoli to the department in under 10 minutes 
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and 
 
(2) Claudio cannot have travelled from Andromeda to the department in under 10 
minutes266. 
 
Now, it seems reasonable to maintain that, while answering that sentence (1) is true we would 
normally mean that travelling from Empoli to the department in under 10 minutes is not possible 
relative to the present state of human (especially Italian) technology, by providing the same 
answer to sentence (2) we would rather mean that travelling from Andromeda to the department 
in under 10 minutes is not possible relative to the known laws of physics.  
Some would take this to reflect the fact that there is no such thing as an absolute modality. 
Truths, it seems, cannot be meaningfully said to be necessary or possible simpliciter, but they are 
usually treated as being necessary or possible relative to something. “Claims about what is 
possible”, it has indeed been argued, “bear an implicit relativization to a set of facts which are 
held constant”267. With respect to sentences (1) and (2), for instance, as we just saw, the two 
relevant sets could be plausibly taken to be the set of all facts concerning human technology, in 
the case of (1), and the set of all known physical laws, in the case of (2). Joseph Melia has tried 
to generalize the same insight by claiming that, whenever we formulate modal judgements, “we 
take a certain collection of truths as given – call these the φ truths – and then define the notion of 
φ-possibility as “compatible with the φ truths” ”268. 
What now matters for our present purposes is the fact that, contrary to the state of affairs 
described in our previous examples, the characterization of what Melia calls the set of φ truths 
relevant to the counterfactual scenario evoked by a given thought experiment does not seem to 
be an immediately obvious task. It is in this sense that Sören Häggqvist has seen in their modal 
nature the “Achilles heel” of both scientific and philosophical thought experiments, that which 
makes them significantly different from ordinary or laboratory experiments269.  
In the first chapter, I tried to draw attention on and account for the mysterious puzzlement that 
every thought experiment seems bound to generate in its potential audience. A significant part of 
that puzzlement, I would now like to add, seems to be due to the fact that, in the case of thought 
experiments, the sense in which a given scenario is said to be possible is not always transparent. 
In fact, as we shall presently see, the way in which most thought experiments are typically 
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presented usually leaves open the possibility of associating different sets of truths with the same 
thought experiment.  
This last aspect is crucial for our purposes, insofar as the purported outcome of any single 
thought experiment, as I will try to show in the next section, will carry a very different epistemic 
weight according to the way in which we decide to interpret the modal notion featuring in it. The 
possibility of drawing significant conclusions from a given thought-experimental scenario, in 
other words, appears to be largely dependent on our previous determining the kind of possibility 
appealed to by the thought experiment. This means, in particular, that the conclusiveness of the 
thought experiment itself, namely its success in providing compelling reasons for rejecting the 
polemical target it is designed to attack, cannot be credited to its argumentative structure only, 
but relies rather on a host of crucial, yet usually not explicitly stated assumptions concerning 
what we hold or do not hold to be possible. 
 
 
3.2 Varieties of modality 
 
The plausibility of the last claim of the previous section, I believe, can be corroborated by means 
of an example. A good candidate for the job could be the case of Twin Earth, the fictional entity 
bred by Hilary Putnam’s fervid imagination, which we considered in the first part of last chapter. 
As we already know from that occasion, Twin Earth is, or so we are asked to imagine, exactly 
like Earth but for one fundamental aspect: the liquid called ‘water’ on Twin Earth is not H 2 O 
but has a different chemical formula, abbreviated by Putnam himself as XYZ. Once confronted 
with a similar scenario, I believe, it is perfectly natural to ask the thought experimenter: “In 
which sense are you taking the existence of this planet of yours to be possible?”. 
Suppose his answer pointed to the fact that his mental creation undeniably constitutes a perfectly 
intelligible logical possibility. As a matter of fact, if we standardly construe a logical possibility 
roughly as a coherently describable state of affairs, i.e. a state of affairs which does not involve 
any explicit or implicit contradiction, then Twin Earth certainly does look as a fairly plausible 
candidate to this kind of possibility. Indeed, the thought experimenter might draw our attention 
to the fact that there is nothing self-contradictory in imagining a universe in which different 
physical laws hold, to the effect that a substance functionally equivalent to the one we call 
‘water’ in our universe might have a different chemical constitution. Nonetheless, we might 
object, insofar as Putnam’s thought experiment aims at establishing a semantical thesis 
concerning our world, and not some other logically possible world, this sense of ‘possible’ does 
not seem to be the relevant one.  
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This kind of objection, in particular, has been meticulously articulated by Kathleen Wilkes270, 
whose views are worth mentioning. With respect to the logical possibility that water had a 
different chemical constitution from the one it actually has, Wilkes observes: 
 
“Even if by reliance on the willing suspension of disbelief we are prepared to say that 
logical possibilities such as these are imaginable […] we also know that most or all of 
these things could not happen: are, in short, impossible. The point is this: what is fine in 
literary fantasy (where the ambition is to entertain) is not necessarily enough to ‘establish a 
phenomenon’ (from which the ambition is to draw conclusions)”271. 
 
According to Wilkes, then, we cannot base thought experiments on mere logical possibilities, 
insofar as the imaginability of these “fairy stories”272, as she calls them, would not be “enough of 
a basis upon which to build conclusions about what we would say if such things did happen”273. 
According to the same author, it is indeed crucial to distinguish between simply framing, or 
entertaining, a mental picture, on the one hand, and what she, borrowing terminology from 
Brown274, calls establishing a phenomenon in thought, on the other.  
This last point is very important for our purposes. In order for us to be able to draw reliable 
conclusions from a thought experimental scenario, Wilkes maintains, that scenario must be 
capable of ‘establishing a phenomenon’ in thought. To accomplish this latter task, in particular, 
we must be able to specify the background conditions relevant to the thought experiment at 
hand. These conditions constitute what we might call the decisive dark side of every thought 
experiment, in that they grant us both that our scenario is adequately described and that, as a 
consequence, significant conclusions can be drawn from it. 
Now, maintains Wilkes, a phenomenon cannot be said to have been established in thought unless 
it is theoretically possible, i.e. compatible with our best current scientific theories275. “The notion 
of imaginability that is needed for genuine thought experiments”, she writes, “will presuppose 
attention to the relevant backing theories”276. In particular, Wilkes stresses the importance of the 
difference between what she calls imagining the ‘that’ and imagining the ‘how’ of a given 
thought-experimental scenario. “If the ‘how’ cannot be imagined”, she very reasonably contends, 
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“the ‘that’ thought-experimental conclusion becomes decidedly meagre”277. Indeed, the scenarios 
that most thought experiments appeal to, being too vaguely sketched, encourage us to disregard 
the fact that, in order for the situation they describe to occur in our world, many other 
concomitant changes would also have to occur, and we cannot be said to have established any 
phenomenon unless we have assessed the theoretical possibility of these latter changes as well278. 
Wilkes considerations seem therefore to rule out as epistemically barren the option of 
interpreting as logical possibility the kind of modality relevant to Putnam’s thought experiment. 
The set of φ truths relevant to the potential conclusiveness of the Twin Earth thought experiment 
then, to couch her opinions in Melia’s words, should not be taken to coincide with the set of all 
know logical truths. 
A more promising strategy, it might seem at first, would rather be that of opting for the set of all 
known physical truths. We could try to maintain, that is, that Twin Earth is possible with respect 
to the presently known laws of physics. Unfortunately, this way of construing the relevant modal 
notion presents a serious shortcoming, insofar as it trades heuristic unfruitfulness for 
incoherence. As a matter of fact, as it has been pointed out279, an appeal to the physical 
possibility of Twin Earth would have the very unwelcome effect of rendering the thought-
experimental scenario itself self-inconsistent. Here is how Sören Häggqvist envisions the 
problem: 
 
“If Twin Earth contains no H 2 O molecules, the [Twin Earthlings] don’t contain any either. 
But we contain plenty. Hence the [Twin Earthlings] cannot be “molecular copies” of us. 
This objection […] is frequently mentioned in passing in the literature, but has never, as far 
as I know, been take seriously. I am not sure what to make of this lassitude, since the 
objection seems quite cogent”280. 
 
As we already know, Putnam’s thought experiment purports to show that it is possible for two 
epistemic agents to be in the exact same mental or brain state and yet for the terms they use to 
differ in extension. It follows that a fundamental requirement of every Twin Earth example is 
that the two agents be exactly identical. In order for the argument to go through, that is, our 
hypothetical doppelgänger on Twin Earth has to be an identical copy of ourselves. Now the 
problem is that this possibility seems to be ruled out by the though experiment itself, in that the 
                                               
277
 Ibid (34). She raises this problem with respect to the thought-experimental challenges put up by artificial 
intelligence to the very notion of personhood, but the point, I believe, applies equally well to the case we are 
considering. 
278
 See Ibid (31). 
279
 See Häggqvist (1996: 169; 2009b: 69) and Crane (1996 [1991]: 290).  
280
 Häggqvist (1996: 169). My emphasis. 
 79
chemical constitution of our bodies comprises molecules of water, a substance which, ex 
hypothesis, is completely absent on Twin Earth. Hence our doppelgänger cannot, by stipulation, 
be an exact copy of ourselves, and this obviously invalidates the conclusiveness of Putnam’s 
thought experiment. 
The above considerations, I think, provide at least prima facie support for the view, advanced 
earlier, according to which a single philosophical thought experiment can neither be regarded as 
informative, nor as conclusive, unless one is already willing, for largely independent reasons, to 
accept specific assumptions concerning the ‘proper’ way of construing the modal notion it 
appeals to. Not all the readings of the relevant modal notion, as I tried to show, allow to draw 
from the thought-experimental scenario the conclusions it was designed to establish. 
 
 
3.3 The old riddle of counterfactuals 
 
A further characteristic feature of philosophical thought experiments, in particular, is especially 
relevant for our purposes. In the first chapter I observed that it may not be possible, nor even 
desirable, to single out a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that an argumentative strategy 
has to satisfy in order to be rightly considered, or to qualify as, a fully-fledged thought 
experiment. Nonetheless, even a quick look at their argumentative structure, naturally suggests 
the following observation. All philosophical thought experiments display a very peculiar 
syntactical feature, namely they make extensive and systematic use of a particular kind of 
subjunctive conditional sentences, usually referred to as counterfactual conditionals (from now 
on counterfactuals)281. A counterfactual is a sentence of the form 
 
“if it were the case that P, then it would be the case that Q”, 
 
usually formalized as, 
 
P → Q, 
 
where P and Q are propositional variables ranging over state of affairs, and where, in particular, 
the state of affairs represented by P is either not actual or taken to be such by the utterer of the 
sentence. A counterfactual, in other words, postulates the obtaining of a certain hypothetical state 
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of affairs and then draws a conclusion concerning what would follow if that state of affairs were 
to actually occur. Assuming, for instance, that I were reasonably certain of the earthly origins of 
my friend Claudio, then a sentence of the form 
  
‘If Claudio came from Andromeda, we would certainly still be friends’ 
 
would be a counterfactual. 
Notoriously, counterfactuals raise a perplexing verification problem, which has long puzzled 
epistemologists in that it seems to seriously undermine the possibility to justify our beliefs in (or 
claims to knowledge of) their consequents. This is due to the fact that, as Nelson Goodman 
famously pointed out in his seminal treatment of the topic282, counterfactual conditionals are 
typically not used in natural language, nor in science for that matter, as truth-functional 
compounds. Another way to put this, is to observe that the logical behaviour of the connective 
‘→’ is generally not regarded as truth-functional.  
As a matter of fact, insofar as a material conditional with a false antecedent is always true, and 
insofar as the antecedent of every counterfactual is, by hypothesis, always false, it follows that 
both a counterfactual and its opposite, if considered as truth-functional compounds, would 
always come out true. This can easily be showed by recalling our previous example. If treated as 
a truth-functional compound, for instance, my original sentence  
 
‘If Claudio came from Andromeda, we would certainly still be friends’ 
 
would turn out to be logically equivalent to its opposite, namely 
 
 ‘If Claudio came from Andromeda, we would certainly not be friends anymore’. 
 
Obviously, this would utterly fail to capture the intended meaning of the original 
counterfactual283. Indeed, by uttering the previous sentence I meant to convey my willingness to 
count Claudio amongst my friends, even if it should turn out that the several odd traits of his 
personality are to be blamed on the fact that he did not grow up on this planet! 
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Moreover, such a treatment would make counterfactuals in general very little informative, to say 
the least. On the contrary, as their ubiquitous use in both scientific and non scientific discourse 
attests, by uttering counterfactuals we certainly do intend to convey some rather specific piece of 
information. A counterfactual sentence, in particular, claims something about the world by 
holding that a certain kind of connection between its antecedent and its consequent obtains. The 
verification problem mentioned above, at this point, is precisely that of providing a reliable 
criterion for assessing when such a connection obtains, or, in other words, of defining the 
circumstances under which a given counterfactual holds284.It should be clear from what I said so 
far that this last task cannot be seen as a purely a priori, nor as a purely a posteriori business.  
It is not purely a priori because, as we have just seen, the connection between the antecedent and 
the consequent of a given counterfactual, if it obtains at all, does not obtain as a matter of pure 
logic. The principle on the basis of which we might hold ourselves justified in inferring the 
consequent of a counterfactual from its antecedent, in other words, cannot possibly be a law of 
logic, but must draw its epistemic value (if any) from some other level of normativity285.  
On the other hand, the problem we are confronted with is not purely a posteriori either. Indeed, 
insofar as a counterfactual conditional concerns what would have ensued if a certain state of 
affairs had occurred which in fact did not occur, we obviously cannot simply look at the way the 
world is in order to determine its truth value286. Determining its truth value, that is, cannot 
possibly be a matter of empirical investigation only. 
At this point, some might feel, it would be fair to ask: How do the above considerations, 
pertaining to the semantics of a particular kind of conditional sentences, namely counterfactuals, 
bear on the general topic of our present work, namely philosophical thought experiments? I 
believe the answer to be the following. Insofar as counterfactuals, as we ha seen, seem to play a 
fundamental role in their internal structure, and insofar as, when first confronted with a well 
designed philosophical thought experiment, we are often willing to regard its premises as 
providing some kind of support for its conclusion, it seems reasonable to maintain that the 
potentially persuasive force of philosophical thought experiments should not be regarded as 
strictly logical in nature. 
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3.4 Regimenting thought experiments 
 
Taking a closer look at the typical inferential structure of most philosophical thought 
experiments will help us reach a better grasp of their modal nature, while at the same time taking 
us a step further in our investigation of their general epistemic status. In order to do this, I will 
take as a starting point the two attempts at regimentation of thought experiments I considered at 
the end of the first chapter, namely the schemas put forward by Roy Sorensen and Sören 
Häggqvist. 
As a matter of fact, I think that these two authors have made some of the most valuable efforts in 
this direction to be found in the literature, or at least of the most profitable from the point o view 
of our present purposes. It can indeed hardly be denied, I think, that the general frameworks put 
forward by Sorensen and Häggqvist both originate from a previous acknowledgement of the 
unavoidably modal nature of all thought experimental thinking. Both proposals, moreover, place 
a strong emphasis on that very peculiar syntactical feature of thought experiments, namely 
counterfactuals, which, as we have seen, plays a crucial role in our understanding of their proper 
functioning287. 
According to both Sorensen and Häggqvist, a significant number of thought experiments share a 
common purpose, namely they can be seen as procedures aimed at causing justified belief 
revision by rejecting a given target statement. This means, in particular, that their function ought 
to be envisioned as a fundamentally negative one. To be relevant for us is the fact that, in order 
to perform this function, thought experiments appeal to counterfactual scenarios and present 
these scenarios as possible. It is important to realize that this last move is motivated by the 
existence of a very common desideratum that we normally tend to impose on our theories. In 
order, that is, to accept a given philosophical theory as a plausible explanation of the 
phenomenon or set of phenomena we are investigating, we want that theory to be, as it is often 
put, ‘counterfactual supporting’. This means, roughly, that our theory should be able to yield true 
sentences of the following form: ‘if it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C’, or 
alternatively, ‘if A were to occur, then C would also occur’. Another way to put this is to 
maintain that we normally envision our theories as more or less implicitly committed to certain 
modal consequences. 
The initial purpose of Sorensen’s schema, as I explained above, was that of charting the general 
logical structure under which, according to his opinion, most thought experiments could be 
subsumed. According to his Kuhnian ‘cleansing model’ of armchair inquiry, it might be useful to 
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recall, thought experiments would be best thought of as a sort of detectors, aimed at revealing 
inconsistencies in our system of beliefs. For this reason, the schema he finds most appropriate to 
formalize their argumentative structure is that of a paradox, standardly construed as a set of 
individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent propositions.  
Thought experiments, in his view, would aim at revising our beliefs by persuading us to reject a 
purported modal consequence of a given target statement. In the case of what Sorensen calls 
necessity refuters, let me recall, the relevant schema would be the following288: 
 
6. S 
7. S ⊃  I 
8. ( I ∧  C ) → W 
9. ¬  ◊ W 
10. ◊ C 
 
The same idea of regimenting thought experiments by envisioning their fundamental structure as 
a group of sentences forming an inconsistent set, i.e. a paradox, as we have seen above, has been 
insightfully elaborated further by Sören Häggqvist, who, as we saw, has recently proposed the 
following alternative schema289, which he has dubbed schema (α): 
 
◊ C 
T ⊃ (C → W) 
C → ¬ W 
∴ ¬ T 
 
Despite their relative simplicity, the two schemas recalled above might run the risk of appearing 
rather abstract to the reader. For this reason, I believe it might be useful for our present purposes 
to see what these schemas look like once applied to single thought experiments. In what follows, 
I will therefore consider two specific applications first suggested by Sorensen and Häggqvist 
themselves. Also, in order to take a first step toward testing their generality, I will subsequently 
move on, in the remainder of this section, to a further application of my own, the legitimacy of 
which, I believe, would probably be granted by the same authors. 
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By subsuming under his general schema Gettier’s thought experiment, which we considered in 
the previous chapter, Sorensen ends up with the following argument290 (for the sake of clarity, 
each sentence will be followed by the formalization provided by the author, enclosed in square 
brackets): 
 
1. Knowledge is justified true belief. [S]. 
2. If knowledge were justified true belief, then, necessarily, all justified true belief that p 
would be knowledge that p. [S ⊃  I]. 
3. If all justified true belief that p were knowledge that p, and Smith had justified true belief 
that p because of luck, then Smith would have knowledge that p because of luck. [( I ∧  C 
) → W]. 
4. It is not possible to have knowledge because of luck. [ ¬  ◊ W]. 
5. It is possible that Smith has justified true belief because of luck. [◊ C]. 
  
In a similar fashion, Häggqvist has put his schema to work by applying it to another thought 
experiment we are already familiar with from last chapter. It is the brilliant science-fictional 
scenario by means of which Hilary Putnam proposed the view on meaning now commonly 
known as semantic externalism. As I noticed above, Putnam’s thought experiment gave birth to 
Twin Earth, one of the most heuristically fruitful yet theoretically controversial fictional entities 
of recent analytic philosophy. Once subsumed under the argument schema he proposes, 
according to Häggqvist, the Twin Earth thought experiment takes the following form291: 
 
• It is possible that Twin Earthians be “neuron for neuron” copies of Earthlings. [◊ C]. 
• If psychological or brain states totally determine the extension of terms, then a Twin 
Earthian “neuron for neuron” copy of an Earthling would refer to water by the term 
‘water’. [T ⊃ (C → W)]. 
• If there were a Twin Earthian “neuron for neuron” copy of an Earthling, he would not 
refer to water by the term ‘water’. [C → ¬ W]. 
• Therefore, psychological or brain states do not completely determine the extension of 
terms. [∴ ¬ T]. 
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As I anticipated above, a first step toward testing both the plausibility and the generality of the 
schemas proposed by Sorensen and Häggqvist might be that of trying to see how they fare once 
applied to one of the philosophical thought experiments we considered in the first chapter. In 
order to do this, I will show what Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, featuring the miserable 
prisoner scientist Mary, might look like once subsumed respectively under the schema proposed 
by the former and under the one proposed by the latter author.  
It will be useful to recall that Jackson’s thought experiment was originally aimed at rejecting the 
metaphysical thesis commonly known as physicalism by providing evidence for the non-
reducibility of some introspectively accessible features of our mental lives, usually referred to as 
qualia. Insofar as physicalism is commonly taken to claim that everything that exists must either 
be physical or supervene on the physical, acknowledging the existence of entities such as qualia, 
according to many, would constitute a powerful counterexample to it. Of course, I am not 
suggesting that the regimentation I am proposing should be seen as the only possible one. On the 
contrary, it seems plausible to maintain that there might be several alternative ways of making a 
single thought experiment fit any of the two schemas I am considering. This last assumption, of 
course, is built into the very nature of these schemes. Here is a version I believe Sorensen would 
subscribe to: 
 
1. Physicalism is true. [S]. 
2. If physicalism were true, then, necessarily, knowing everything physical there is to know, 
would amount to knowing everything there is to know. [S ⊃  I]. 
3. If knowing everything physical there is to know amounted to knowing everything there is 
to know, and Mary managed to learn everything physical there is to know from inside a 
black and white room, then, once released form her room, Mary would not learn anything 
new. [( I ∧  C ) → W]. 
4. It is not possible that Mary, upon release from her room, does not learn anything new. [¬  
◊ W]. 
5. It is possible that Mary manages to learn everything physical there is to know from inside 
a black and white room . [◊ C]. 
 
And here, in turn, is a plausible way in which, if I understand him correctly, Häggqvist would 
envision the same thought experiment: 
 
• It is possible that Mary manages to learn everything physical there is to know from inside 
a black and white room. [◊ C]. 
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• If physicalism is true, then, if Mary managed to learn everything physical there is to know 
from inside a black and white room, then, once released form her room, Mary would not 
learn anything new. [T ⊃ (C → W)]. 
• If Mary managed to learn everything physical there is to know from inside a black and 
white room, then, once released form her room, Mary would learn something new. [C 
→ ¬ W] 
• Therefore, physicalism is false. [∴ ¬ T]. 
 
Both regimentations, I believe, provide very plausible reconstructions of the “essence”, so to 
speak, of Jackson’s reasoning in his much celebrated thought experiment, insofar as they seem to 
capture well both its underlying logical structure and its remarkable persuasive force. Although 
the generality of any regimentation attempt can never be established conclusively, I think that 
their apparent plausibility can be reasonably taken as prima facie evidence for the purported 
generality of their corresponding argument schemas, i.e. for the expected consistent application 
of these schemas to other thought experiments. 
With respect to the unavoidably modal nature of all thought experiments, in particular, to which I 
drew attention in the previous sections, I think it is important to observe that, by their own 
nature, the general schemas considered above, once applied to single thought experiments, do 
not tell us what is the kind of modality relevant to the counterfactual scenarios at issue. The two 
schemas, in other words, are completely neutral with respect to the class of modal truths 
appealed to by the thought experiment to which they are applied. While, on the one hand, this 
constitutes a further confirmation of their generality, it seems to provide, on the other, further 
support to the hypothesis according to which the epistemic weight of a given thought experiment 
is not dependent solely on its logical structure. 
 
 
3.5 The model at work 
 
Attempts at subsuming other thought experiments under the two schemas, moreover, as I would 
like to argue, suggest that Häggqvist’s regimentation proposal ought to be preferred over 
Sorensen one for at least three reasons. 
For one thing, I think that Häggqvist’s schema has the advantage of making more visible the 
similarity between thought experiments and ordinary experiments advocated by Sorensen’s 
Machian stance. As a matter of fact, as we saw in the first chapter, Häggqvist explicitly presents 
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the schema for thought experiments simply as a modalized version of the schema which, 
according to his opinion, characterizes ordinary, laboratory experiments.  
A second reason for preferring his regimentation, I believe, is that it seems to do a better job at 
representing the dialectical progression which actually takes place in the performing of most 
thought experiments, thereby rendering the regimentation itself less artificial and more fit to be 
applied to actual cases. Indeed, contrary to what Sorensen’s schema suggests, a thought 
experiment usually starts by postulating the possibility of a counterfactual state of affairs, rather 
than drawing modal implications from a given theory.  The latter move is indeed usually made 
only once the audience has already granted the possibility of the scenario. 
The third reason is to be found in what I take to be Häggqvist’s most valuable contribution to the 
study of thought experiments inferential structure. I have already pointed out that his 
regimentation develops further Sorensen’s fundamental intuition, according to which the 
effectiveness of a successful thought experiment would originate from its power to generate a 
paradox. Starting from this assumption, as we have seen, Häggqvist has been able to provide a 
very profitable regimentation of the possible kinds of argumentative strategies available to the 
potential critic of the thought experiment. The three further schemas that he associates to the one 
intended to reflect the thought experimenter’s intentions, as a matter of fact, prove themselves 
very useful in the difficult task of accounting for the often very intricate debate sparked off by 
the purported outcome of the thought experiment at hand.  
 
A good way to appreciate the usefulness of Häggqvist’s contribution, I think, could be that of 
applying schemas (β), (γ), and (δ), that I introduced in the first chapter292, to the same thought 
experiment against which, in the last section, we tested the plausibility of schema (α), namely 
Jackson’s knowledge argument. The three schemas, let me recall, are the following: 
 
(β) T    (γ) T    (δ) T 
      ◊ C         ◊ C         T ⊃ (C → W) 
      T ⊃ (C → W)        C → ¬ W        C → ¬ W 
      ∴ ¬ ( C → ¬ W)       ∴ ¬  (T ⊃ (C → W))       ∴ ¬◊ C 
 
Granting then that schema (α) itself, as we saw in the last section, appropriately reflects 
Jackson’s original intentions, schema (β), i.e. the so-called biting the bullet strategy, would 
consist in defending physicalism by refusing to assent to the conditional C → ¬ W. This would 
amount to denying that Mary, once released from her room, would actually learn anything new.  
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It is interesting to notice that this is precisely the stance that Daniel Dennett has taken at this 
regard293. Jackson’s argument, in his view, would simply be a bad thought experiment, “an 
intuition pump”, according to his famous expression, “that actually encourages us to 
misunderstand his premises”294. Its purportedly “obvious” outcome, Dennett laments, is merely a 
consequence of the fact that, when imagining the counterfactual scenario depicted by the thought 
experiment, we usually, and  understandably, fail to imagine exactly what the thought 
experimenter is asking us to imagine, namely that Mary has “all the physical information”. This 
failure, in his view, is due to the fact that the thought experimenter directions, being 
“preposterously immense”295, lay far beyond the reaches of our imagination. Nonetheless, so 
goes the gist of Dennett’s objection, if those directions were followed correctly, it would not at 
all be absurd to maintain that Mary, upon release from her room, would not in fact learn anything 
new. 
The application of schema (γ), in turn, which Häggqvist dubs the irrelevance strategy, would 
consist in denying the nested conditional T ⊃ (C → W). With respect to our case, this move 
would amount to the claim that physicalism, once properly construed, is not committed to predict 
that, if the counterfactual situation envisioned by the thought experiment were to occur, Mary 
would not learn anything new.  
As a matter of fact, as soon as 1984296 Terence Horgan claimed that Jackson’s attack on 
physicalism misses his target, in that it rests upon “a subtle equivocation”297 between two 
different senses of the phrase ‘physical information’. In order to dispel the confusion to which 
the knowledge argument falls pray, Horgan distinguished two relevant senses of the phrase 
‘physical information’ such that it would not be legitimate to infer, as Jackson does, from its 
possession in the first sense to its possession in the second sense. His distinction reads as 
follows: 
 
“Let S be a sentence that expresses information about processes of a certain specific kind, 
such as human perceptual processes. We shall say that S expresses explicitly physical 
information just in case S belongs to, or follows from, a theoretically adequate physical 
account of those processes. And we shall say that S expresses ontologically physical 
information just in case (i) all the entities referred to or quantified over in S are physical 
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entities, and (ii) all the properties and relations expressed by the predicates in S are 
physical properties and relations”298. 
 
While explicitly physical information, according to Horgan, has to be expressed in physicalistic 
language, ontologically physical information, in order to be such, does not need to satisfy this 
requirement, and can therefore be expressed in other languages. In other words, there may be 
sentences which express ontologically physical information while not expressing at the same 
time explicitly physical information.  
Now, maintains Horgan, insofar as it does not mean to rule out the information-conveying power 
of languages other than the one of physical theories, physicalism is obviously a thesis concerning 
ontologically physical information. It follows, in his view, that it is plausible to hold that Mary, 
at the moment of her first color experience, does obtain new knowledge. Nonetheless, she is not 
likely to express her new knowledge by means of a similarity judgement such as ‘Seeing ripe 
tomatoes is like seeing bright sunsets’, because she has probably already learned that from her 
studies. Rather, she will express it by using an indexical term, as in ‘Seeing ripe tomatoes has 
this property’299, where ‘this’ designates a phenomenal feature of the perceptual experience she’s 
undergoing. This last sentence, in particular, may very well express ontologically physical 
information, insofar as the referent of the phrase ‘this property’ could be a physical property 
which Mary is now experiencing from a first-person perspective. The above argument then, 
according to Horgan, would show that physicalism, once properly construed, is compatible with 
Mary’s learning something new upon release. “The information is new”, he writes, “not because 
the quale she experiences is a non-physical property, but because she is now acquainted with this 
property from the experiential perspective”300. 
The application of schema (δ), finally, which Häggqvist dubs impossibility strategy, would 
consist in defending the target thesis by rejecting the plausibility of the counterfactual scenario 
itself, i.e by denying assent to the modal claim according to which the situation envision by the 
thought experiment would be possible.  
To my knowledge, no one explicitly took this stance with respect to Jackson’s knowledge 
argument. Nonetheless, I believe that a similar line of reasoning can be said to be implicit in 
Kathleen Wilkes reaction to Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment, considered above301. 
Indeed, as we saw, the question as to whether philosophical thought experiments can actually 
contribute to our understanding of reality, according to Wilkes, depends crucially on their ability 
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to ‘establish a phenomenon in thought’, to use her own expression. Following her lead, then, it 
would certainly be possible to question Jackson’s counterfactual scenario and to maintain that, 
insofar as the background of such scenario is not adequately described, the purported outcome of 
his thought experiment is bound to be inconclusive. 
 
 
3.6 Defeasible reasoning 
 
The considerations of the previous section, I believe, suggest that Häggqvist’s schema (α) can be 
regarded as a profitable regimentation attempt, in that it adequately reflects the typical inferential 
structure of most philosophical thought experiments. If one is willing to grant this, it seems quite 
natural to ask what kind of inference (α) instantiates.  
For the present purposes, we can provisionally think of an inference as the mental act of deriving 
a sentence, or a proposition, from another sentence, or proposition, according to a rule. With 
respect to the inference instantiated by (α), as we already argued in section 3.3 above, the rule 
which allows us to derive the conclusion from its premises is not a deductive one. The argument 
instantiated by our schema, in other words, is not deductively valid. It might be useful to recall 
here that an inference is standardly said to be deductively valid just in case it is not possible for 
its premises to be all true, without its conclusion also being true. Now, insofar as the kind the 
reasoning underlying a philosophical thought experiment, as our examples show, does not meet 
this requirement, and insofar as its premises seem nonetheless to provide compelling reasons for 
accepting its conclusion, it seems plausible to assume that (α) formalizes a non deductive 
inference. 
As a matter of fact, a striking and long acknowledged feature of human reasoning in general is 
that most of the inferences our beliefs stem from are clearly non deductive ones, meaning that 
the truth of their premises are usually taken to provide some sort of support for their conclusions, 
i.e. to have some sort of confirmation-theoretic import, without at the same time guaranteeing 
their truth.  
One obvious case is that of induction. If, based on my having never seen an honest politician, I 
conclude that all politicians are either dishonest men or become such after going into politics, 
my conclusion is justified to a certain extent. Nonetheless, it could certainly be false, without any 
of its premises being false as well.  
An equally, perhaps even more ubiquitous case is that of abduction, or, as it is often called, 
inference to the best explanation, which Gilbert Harman referred to as the most basic form of 
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non deductive inference302. We can think, for instance, of the major role it plays in attributing 
mental states to other people. Suppose I were inclined to think that his Tuscan origins would best 
explain the fact that Claudio is unable to correctly pronounce the letter ‘c’. My conclusion, 
which is probably correct, could be justified (to some small extent), but it could certainly not be 
said to follow deductively from my premises. Indeed, Claudio’s belief that girls like Tuscan 
accent, for instance, and his corresponding decision to fake it, could explain his (apparent) 
inability to correctly pronounce the letter ‘c’ equally well. Understanding natural language, in 
general, can also be thought of as a matter of inferring, on the basis of some background 
knowledge, to (what we take to be) the best explanation of why some speaker uttered what she 
did. Similar considerations, it seems, hold for the case of a medical diagnosis, where a certain 
disease might be held by a physician, again on the basis of some more or less tacit background 
knowledge, to be the best explanation for the symptoms of her patient. 
Non deductive inferential patterns are the subject matter of a relatively new and burgeoning area 
of research in both epistemology and logic, which focuses on the study of what has come to be 
referred to generally as defeasible reasoning. According to a widely agreed upon 
characterization, a piece of reasoning is usually said to be defeasible when the corresponding 
argument is rationally compelling but not deductively valid303. An argument of this sort, in turn, 
is itself regarded as defeasible. A good defeasible argument, according to the same 
characterization, will be one in which the premises are taken to provide evidential support for the 
conclusion, even if it is possible for such premises to be true and for the conclusion to be false. 
Broadly speaking, the study of what has come to be referred to under the label of defeasible 
reasoning can be traced back to Aristotle’s Topics and the Posterior Analytics, where the Greek 
philosopher set out to inquire into various forms of dialectical reasoning. Its most recent 
rediscovery, in the early sixties, is usually associated with the names of Roderick Chisholm304 
and John Pollock305, whose epistemological work was explicitly intended to develop further the 
insights of their illustrious ancient predecessor. Subsequently, by the early eighties, researchers 
in artificial intelligence, grappling with the task of implementing reasoning in AI systems, made 
large use of the notion and developed it further, devising highly sophisticated formal 
frameworks306. 
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John Pollock has recently lamented the fact that, according to a long and well established 
tradition in Western philosophy, a good piece of reasoning, in order to be such, is required to be 
deductively valid307. This status quo, according to his opinion, is to be blamed for the fact that 
the exploration of other forms of non deductive reasoning, such as inference to the best 
explanation or analogical reasoning for instance, on which we heavily rely in our everyday 
cognitive lives, has remained very rudimentary until quite recent times. What, starting from the 
sixties, brought to the gradual dismissal of the previously dominant tradition, maintains the same 
author, was “the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but 
clearly confer justification on their conclusions”308. Various sources of knowledge, in particular, 
such as perception, memory, or testimony are often taken as prima facie reasons for accepting 
the purported truth of some hypothesis. As a basic example of this kind of reasoning, he 
mentions the case of perception: 
 
“Most of our knowledge of the world derives from some sort of perception. But clearly, 
perception is fallible. For instance, I may believe that the wall is grey on the basis of its 
looking grey to me. But it may actually be white, and it only looks grey because it is dimly 
illuminated. In this example, my evidence (the wall’s looking grey) makes it reasonable for 
me to conclude that the wall is grey, but further evidence could force me to retract that 
conclusion. Such a conclusion is said to be justified defeasibly, and the considerations that 
would make it unjustified are defeaters”309. 
 
Another interesting example is to be found in the common phenomenon he calls temporal 
projection: 
 
“Suppose you are standing in a courtyard between two clock towers, and I ask you whether 
the clocks agree. You look at one, noting that it reads “2:45”, and than you turn to the other 
and note that it reads “2:45”, so you report that they do. But note that you are making an 
assumption. You could not look at the two clocks at the same instant, so you are assuming 
that the time reported by the first clock did not change dramatically in the short interval it 
took you to turn and look at the second clock. Of course, there is no logical guarantee that 
this is so. Things change. […] Thus a defeasible presumption of stability must be a 
primitive part of our reasoning about the world”310. 
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The two examples above introduce us to a fundamental feature of defeasible reasoning, which, as 
we shall see, is very important for our present purposes. Contrary to deductive inferences, the 
reason schemes instantiated by defeasible inferences can have what Pollock calls defeaters, i.e. 
pieces of information that can mandate the retraction of their conclusion311. 
While epistemological approaches to defeasible reasoning are mainly concerned with the 
transmission of warrant from the premises to the conclusion of a given defeasible argument, the 
logical approaches focus primarily on the relationship between propositions. Approaching the 
matter from this angle allows us to introduce a further feature of defeasible reasoning, although it 
would probably be more appropriate to speak of a different side of the same feature. As a matter 
of fact, both deductive and defeasible logic are aimed at studying a certain consequence relation 
between propositions. Now, while in the former case the consequence relation is said to be 
monotonic, in the latter case it is usually called non-monotonic. 
An inference rule is said to be non-monotonic if it allows us to infer certain conclusions from a 
subset of a set S of premises which cannot be inferred from set S as a whole. Another way to put 
this is to maintain that, and this is the crucial point, the relation of support between premises and 
conclusion can be defeated by additional information. This phenomenon is particularly visible in 
the case of induction. Indeed, the conclusion of an inductive inference, as it is well known, can 
be invalidated by adding further information to the base of our induction. 
 
In the light of what I have said so far, I would like to consider the following proposal. As others 
have already pointed out312, scientific thought experiments might be plausibly looked at as very 
peculiar and potentially fruitful forms of defeasible, i.e. non-monotonic reasoning. In what 
follows, I would like to suggest that the same point applies as well, mutatis mutandis, to 
philosophical thought experiments. Acknowledging the defeasible nature of the inference 
underlying a philosophical thought experiment, as a matter of fact, seems to me a plausible and 
very natural way of extending the approach first put forward by Sorensen and Häggqvist, the 
usefulness of which I have already tried to defend in the previous sections. 
Nonetheless, in order to show the plausibility of this suggestion, allow me to go back to one of 
our previous favourite examples, namely the case of one of the most famous (fictional) scientist 
ever, Mary. In the previous section I claimed that Daniel Dennett’s early reaction to Jackson’s 
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knowledge argument could be seen as an instance of Häggqvist’s schema (β). This schema, let 
me recall, has been dubbed by its creator the biting the bullet strategy for resisting the conclusion 
of a thought experiment, insofar as it consists in the stubborn rejection of its central modal 
intuition. As applied to our case, therefore, Dennett’s move, as we saw above, was that of 
denying that Mary, once released from her room, would actually learn anything new. 
To be interesting from the present point of view is the way in which Dennett intends to overturn 
the purported ‘obviousness’ of the thought-experimental conclusion. He does this by means of a 
personal narrative contribution to Jackson’s original thought experiment, i.e. by adding further 
information to the counterfactual situation it invites us to reflect upon. Jackson’s original story, 
Dennett suggests, could be “legitimately” continued as follows: 
 
“And so, one day, Mary’s captors decided it was time for her to see colors. As a trick, they 
prepared a bright blue banana to present at her first color experience ever. Mary took one 
look at it and said “Hey! You tried to trick me! Bananas are yellow, but this one is blue!” 
Her captors were dumfounded. How did she do it? “Simple”, she replied. “You have to 
remember that I know everything – absolutely everything – that could ever be known about 
the physical causes and effects of color vision. So of course before you brought the banana 
in, I had already written down, in exquisite detail, exactly what physical impression a 
yellow object or a blue object (or a green object, etc.) would make on my nervous system. 
So I already knew exactly what thoughts I would have (because, after all, the “mere 
disposition” to think about this or that is not one of your qualia, is it?)”313. 
 
Adding new information then, and enriching thereby the counterfactual state of affairs 
contemplated by Jackson’s thought experiment314, as the above passage shows, can have the 
power to undercut the persuasive force of its conclusion, thereby mandating its retraction. As a 
matter of fact, in the wake of Dennett’s astute narrative intervention, the original outcome of the 
thought experiment has not only ceased to be experienced as rationally compelling, it has also 
handed this crucial psychological feature over to an opposite claim, to the effect that now it 
seems just ‘obvious’ that Mary, upon release, would not actually learn anything new. 
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Nothing seems to prevent us, at this point, from suspecting that adding yet further information to 
Dennett’s new story might end up reinforcing Jackson’s original conclusion, or a different one 
for that matter, and that this process could be potentially carried on indefinitely. Appropriate 
further additions of information to the original counterfactual scenario, in other words, seem to 
constitute, for the case of a given philosophical thought experiment, what John Pollock calls 
defeaters of a given argument. Indeed, it seems safe to forecast that Dennett’s kind of reaction to 
Jackson’s knowledge argument is very likely to prove effective on other thought experiments as 
well, and this fact, I believe, lands further support to my earlier proposal, according to which 
philosophical thought experiments are best seen as not yet fully explored instances of defeasible, 
non-monotonic reasoning. 
 
 
3.7 Vindicating philosophical thought experiments 
 
If a general moral were to be drawn from the previous section, as well as from the whole of this 
work, I believe that it would be the following. If, by whatever means, one comes to acknowledge 
the undeniably massive role that many known forms of non-monotonic reasoning play in both 
the more practical and the more theoretical intellectual endeavours of our species, as well as the 
many unexpected ways in which they have valuably contributed and still contribute to the 
growth of human knowledge, then Pollock’s observation, according to which “defeasible 
reasoning is the norm, and deductive reasoning is the exception”315, is likely to appear to his eyes 
as little more than an obvious fact, which is barely worth mentioning. And yet, it would hardly 
be an exaggeration to maintain that defeasible reasoning has often been carelessly overlooked by 
a large part of our philosophical tradition. As a matter of historical fact, philosophers interested 
in the study of human reasoning, over the centuries, have focused their attention mainly on far 
more logically well-behaved forms of inference than the ones we find at work in our actual 
reasoning. 
While reflecting on the inferential structure of philosophical thought experiments, my attention 
was drawn to the work of the Italian logician and philosopher of mathematics Carlo Cellucci. In 
recent years, Cellucci developed a  philosophical view concerning the nature of mathematical 
method and the growth of mathematical knowledge, which he has called the open world view 
and which might be interesting in its own right316, but the details of which do not need concern 
us here. To be relevant from our point of view is rather the fact that, in order to advocate his 
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views further, Cellucci has recently devised a classification of inference rules which he has 
presented as an alternative to what he holds to be the currently dominant one. This classification, 
as I would like to argue, contains an insight that I find to be highly relevant to our present 
purposes317. 
According to what Cellucci calls the standard classification of inference rules318, all inferences 
can be conveniently divided into the two subclasses of deductive inferences and ampliative ones. 
While deductive inferences, on the one hand, are of course expected to be necessarily truth-
preserving, i.e. to transfer (without exceptions) the truth of their premises to the truth of their 
conclusions, ampliative inferences, on the other hand, which are potentially able to contribute to 
our knowledge by generating new information which is not already contained in their premises, 
are considered as not necessarily truth-preserving. The situation then, according to the standard 
classification, is the one presented in the following tree diagram319: 
 
 
                                          
 
 
Cellucci finds the general view which underlies the standard classification patently inadequate. 
In fact, according to the above classification, every inference rule is bound to be either deductive 
or ampliative. On the contrary, he maintains, we normally make large use of defeasible 
inferential patterns that present themselves as neither deductive nor ampliative. One such 
inferential pattern, in his view, would constitute “one of the most important means of obtaining 
hypotheses”320, namely abduction. 
In order to defend this position, Cellucci argues as follows321. Once formalized, abduction 
responds to the following schema: B →A, A, ∴B. Insofar as this schema, as it is well known, is 
not deductively valid, any piece of reasoning which instantiates it will not necessarily be truth 
preserving, i.e. it will not always transfer truth from its premises to its conclusions. According to 
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the standard classification then, we should expect abduction to be ampliative, but this, Cellucci 
argues, does not seem to be the case either, in that its conclusion (B) would be already contained 
in one of its premises (B →A) and hence, strictly speaking, our inference would not contain in 
itself any amount of new information. New information, maintains indeed Cellucci, “is not 
generated by [abduction], but rather by the process that yields its major premise B →A, thus it is 
generated before [abduction]”322. 
Insofar then as he takes it to be neither deductive nor ampliative, abductive reasoning constitutes, 
in his view, a clear counterexample to the standard classification, which stands therefore in 
serious need of radical revision. In particular, while according to the standard classification, as 
we have seen above, the main distinction to be drawn amongst inference rules would be the one 
between truth-preserving and not truth-preserving ones, “the only adequate classification of 
inference rules”, according to Cellucci, ought to be given in terms of ampliativity323. 
Accordingly, he proposes to start by dividing inference rules in ampliative and non-ampliative 
ones. These latter are then further divided into deductive ones, which are truth preserving, and 
abduction, which is not. The following, therefore, is the tree diagram of the new classification 
we end up with by following his instructions: 
            
  
      
I mentioned earlier that the new classification devised by Cellucci contained an insight that I 
found highly relevant for our present purposes, and I think I am now in the position to show 
wherein it lies. In order to do this, I need to state beforehand that I do not intend to discuss here 
whether abduction actually has or indeed fails to have the particular features that Cellucci 
ascribes to it. The interest of his classification for our present purposes comes rather from the 
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fact that it makes room for other kinds of non-ampliative and not necessarily truth-preserving 
inference rules besides the strictly deductive ones. When first confronted with Cellucci’s 
proposal, it suddenly occurred to me that, regardless of the tenability of his views on abduction, 
this last insight deserved to be developed further. Indeed, while trying to come to grips with his 
classification, my attention was powerfully caught by the observation which he decided to end its 
presentation with. “It remains an open question”, he writes, “whether, in addition to [abduction], 
there are other interesting inference rules that are both non-ampliative and not necessarily truth 
preserving”324. 
Now, as I hope the considerations I developed in the present work have contributed to make 
clear, I believe that the kind of reasoning which takes place in most philosophical thought 
experiments is best seen as instantiating inference rules of this latter sort. While in fact non-
ampliativity, on the one hand, seems implicit in what I, endorsing Sorensen’s cleansing model of 
armchair inquiry, have indicated above as the primary, ideal function of a philosophical thought 
experiment, namely that of making us more rational by detecting inconsistencies hidden in our 
system of beliefs, Häggqvist schema (α), on the other hand, which I take to reflect the typical 
inferential structure of most philosophical thought experiments, is not, strictly speaking, a 
deductively valid inference, and hence not necessarily truth preserving. 
I take these two features to be shared, in particular, by all the philosophical thought experiments 
considered in the previous chapter. As an example, we can recall the one due to Edmund 
Gettier325, whose form, as regimented under schema (α), we have not considered so far. Gettier’s 
epistemological thought experiment, let me recall, was specifically designed in order to reject the 
classical tripartite analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge could be defined in 
terms of justified true belief. Being a justified true belief, in other words, according to the same 
view, would be a necessary and sufficient condition for being knowledge. Once subsumed under 
schema (α) then, Gettier’s examples become inferences of the following form: 
 
• It is possible that Smith has justified true belief because of luck. [◊ C]. 
• If knowledge is justified true belief, then, if Smith had justified true belief because of 
luck, then he would have knowledge. [T ⊃ (C → W)]. 
• If Smith had justified true belief because of luck, then he would not have knowledge. [C 
→ ¬ W] 
• Therefore, knowledge is not justified true belief. [∴ ¬ T]. 
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As I already mentioned above, I take the non-ampliativity of this inference to be implicated by 
the cleansing model that I endorse, according to which philosophical thought experiments aim at 
generating justified belief revision by detecting inconsistencies contained in our system of 
beliefs. With respect to the present case, in particular, it seems indeed plausible to maintain that 
the counterfactual scenario appealed to by Gettier’s thought experiment has not the immediate 
effect of generating any new beliefs about knowledge, but rather that of providing evidence for 
the fact that our current belief, according to which knowledge would be justified true belief, is 
not in fact consistent with the rest of our currently held beliefs, and must therefore be revised. 
As to our second feature then, namely the fact of being not necessarily truth-preserving, I 
believe that it will be sufficient to point out that, insofar as the argumentative core of Gettier’s 
brilliant thought experiment seems to be fully captured by the logical form of schema (α), we 
seem justified in denying to the kind of reasoning which takes place in it the power to transfer 
(without exceptions) the truth of its premises to the truth of its conclusions. 
 
I would like to conclude this chapter with the following consideration. In his much discussed 
prolegomena to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, Stephen Stich put down his Jamesian 
pragmatist credo in the following words: 
 
“There are no intrinsic epistemic virtues. Rather, for the pragmatist, cognitive mechanisms 
or processes are to be viewed as tools or policies and evaluated in much the same way that 
we evaluate other tools or policies. One system of cognitive mechanisms is preferable to 
another if, in using it, we are more likely to achieve those things that we intrinsically 
value”326. 
 
Sharing a similar pragmatic spirit, Cellucci holds that any attempt at justifying inference rules 
cannot avoid taking into account their role in knowledge. In order to do this, he contrasts the 
validation of an inference rule with what he, following Feigl, calls its vindication327. Contrary to 
the former, which aims at proving that any given inference rule can be derived from other 
inference rules, “to vindicate an inference rule”, he writes, “is to demonstrate that it is 
appropriate to a certain end”328. According to his opinion, which he argues for at some length, 
some basic inference rules cannot be validated but only vindicated329. In particular he maintains 
that, while the ultimate non-deductive rules, on the one hand, would be the ones appropriate to 
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the end of discovering new hypotheses, the ultimate deductive and abductive rules, on the other, 
would be the ones appropriate to the end of making explicit the content (or part of it) that is 
implicit in their premises330. If my proposal is on the right track, then this should also be 
regarded as the primary purpose of those fascinating cognitive tools that go under the name of 
philosophical thought experiments. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
“We can improve our conceptual 
scheme, our philosophy, bit by bit 
while continuing to depend on it for 
support; but we cannot detach 
ourselves from it and compare it 
objectively with an unconceptualized 
reality”331 
 
W.V.O. Quine 
 
 
 
The time has now come to take stock of our previous considerations and to make room for them 
into as organic a picture of their subject matter as they allow. In the introduction to the present 
work, I assimilated my study of philosophical thought experiments to the investigations of an 
inquisitive naturalist, trying to come to grips with a very puzzling feature of human cognitive 
life. I am well aware of the fact that this simile is unavoidably bound to sound intolerably 
unpalatable to some hard-headed rationalist. Oddly enough, over a century an a half after the 
publishing of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, there still reigns, it seems, amongst 
many philosophers, an insurmountable resistance towards acknowledging the harmless fact that, 
insofar as human beings are part of nature, human reasoning itself can be considered as natural a 
phenomenon as any other, the investigation of which falls squarely within the limits of natural 
science.  
I find it symptomatic of the present state of affairs, for instance, that a naturalistic minded 
philosopher such as Hilary Kornblith might have found it necessary to stress the fact that “a view 
of philosophy as empirically informed”, as the closing lines of his book on Knowledge and its 
Place in Nature soothingly read, “does not take philosophy away from philosophers”332. 
Philosophy, in particular, according to the view he articulates in his book, may and should be 
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regarded as an intellectual activity aimed at empirically informed theory construction333. As I 
hope my previous considerations have indirectly contributed to make clear, I share vary similar 
views concerning the proper role of philosophical inquiry. With respect, in particular, to the 
apparently profound dilemma of whether philosophical activity ought to be envisioned as 
‘internal’ or as ‘external’ to natural science, I must confess that, despite the best of intentions, I 
find it too idle a question to be seriously addressed. 
As an understandable consequence of this general attitude towards philosophy, I am far from 
willing to abjure my heretical simile, and in fact I intend to exploit it even further, in order to 
summarize the partial conclusions that I have arrived at concerning the nature of philosophical 
thought experiments. So bear with me for the last few pages! For expository reasons, I propose 
to start by drawing a very loose, an yet, as we shall presently see, remarkably profitable analogy 
between the single functional components of living organisms, namely organs, and a large 
family of functional components of human mental life, namely rational processes. In the last 
chapter of the present work, after all, I claimed that a philosophical thought experiment would be 
best seen and treated as a cognitive tool, and the ancient Greek word for instrument, organon, 
seems to suggest that our analogy is not too far-fetched. According to this analogy then, when I 
say that a thought experiment could be fruitfully regarded as  a rational instrument, intended to 
perform specific tasks, I mean it much in the same sense in which ancient Aristotelian 
commentators considered the logical work of their teacher as an organon, i. e. an instrument 
philosophers might use in order to cope with their specific philosophical problems. 
Suppose then that one lucky day our imaginary naturalist were to discover a new species on a 
remote island. Suppose further that, at the moment of dissecting the body of the unlucky animal, 
and to his great surprise, he were to find within it a mysterious organ, whose peculiar aspect 
were to strike him as slightly familiar and yet at the same time different from anything that he 
had ever encountered before in his previous anatomical explorations. At this point, in compliance 
with a long established methodology amongst his fellow anatomists, he might start ‘interrogating 
nature’ by asking three different, though closely related, questions. The first of these questions 
would concern the organ’s anatomy, and could be readily addressed by asking: What is its 
structure? What does the organ look like? The second question, in turn, would concern its 
physiology, that is its inner functioning, and could therefore be addressed by simply asking: 
What does it do? How does it function? The third and final question would concern its purpose, 
and would be normally addressed by asking: Why does it do it? To what end? 
One of the reasons that make me regard the above analogy as particularly illuminating for the 
present purposes, is that a promising way to look at philosophical analysis, I believe, is to 
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envision it as a non invasive attempt at dissecting human rationality. Accordingly, in what 
follows, I will try to state tautly what I take to be the main results of the present work by 
following the same tripartite structure. I will therefore start by providing an answer to the first 
question, concerning the anatomy of our mysterious “organ”, namely: What is the structure of a 
philosophical thought experiment? After considering various proposals, I have come to believe 
that, insofar as a number of premises intended to support a specific conclusion are clearly 
distinguishable in it, a philosophical thought experiment can be considered as either being or 
being reducible to a peculiar kind of argument. A characteristic feature of these arguments, I 
have further contended, is that, insofar as they rely crucially on the positing of counterfactual 
scenarios, they are inherently modal, and raise specific epistemic problems related to the 
justification of counterfactual conditionals. In particular, as I have tried to argue, I believe it is 
reasonable to maintain that the typical logical structure of most philosophical thought 
experiments is the one indicated by Roy Sorensen and Sören Häggqvist in their respective work, 
namely the structure of a paradox, i.e. a set of individually plausible yet jointly inconsistent 
sentences. The formal regimentation that best reflects the dialectical progression of a 
philosophical thought experiment, I have also suggested, seems to be the one put forward by 
Sören Häggqvist and referred to above as schema (α). 
The regimentation attempt just mentioned, allows us now to provide an answer to the second 
question, concerning the physiology of our epistemic tool, namely: How does a philosophical 
thought experiment function? What does it do? As I have tried to show by expounding and 
analysing the inner workings of Häggqvist’s schema, most philosophical thought experiments 
are specifically designed by their creators to play a fundamentally negative role. Their proper 
function is that of rejecting a given target statement, or in general a target theory, by disproving 
one of its modal consequences. They perform this function, in particular, by exploiting our 
psychological ability to contemplate counterfactual scenarios and to make reliable judgements 
concerning their most likely or unlikely consequences. Insofar as we expect our best theories to 
be ‘counterfactual supporting’, i.e. we normally take them to be more or less implicitly 
committed to certain modal consequences, a philosophical thought experiment will typically 
appeal to a counterfactual scenario in order to show that the modal consequences the theory 
would be committed to if the particular state of affairs were to actually occur, fall short of 
matching our current intuitions. These intuitions, in particular, as I tried to show, once couched 
within a naturalistic framework, become a fairly uncontroversial component of philosophical 
inquiry. To the extent that they are not taken to provide some sort of unintelligible epistemic 
access to a realm of eternal a priori truths, that is, and to the extent that they are placed within a 
reliabilist epistemological framework, intuitions help us making our folk-theories explicit. In this 
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sense, philosophical thought experiments afford a fallible, but nonetheless valuable instrument to 
explore relations amongst intuitions not immediately detectable by introspection, indirectly 
showing us the limits of our introspective powers. No one interested in understanding the nature 
of human knowledge, I believe, would seriously consider for a minute the possibility of getting 
entirely rid of perception on the basis that it has often been proved to be fallible. The same 
inquirer would probably consider far more reasonable the painstaking effort of trying to single 
out specific conditions under which our perception is most likely to err. Something similar, I 
think, applies to our intuitions. 
We are now left with our third and final question, concerning the purpose of our tool, namely: 
What is the purpose, or at least the primary purpose of a philosophical thought experiment? Why 
does it perform the function that we have just described? Following a suggestion advanced by 
Roy Sorensen, which I find to be reminiscent of Thomas Kuhn’s previous reflection on the same 
topic, I have tried to show that most philosophical thought experiments are primarily aimed at 
generating justified belief revision by detecting inconsistencies contained in our more or less 
conscious system of beliefs. The same idea can be put by saying that, according to the construal I 
have tried to defend, they are instruments which may enable us to decide whether certain beliefs 
we ‘live by’ are consistent with the rest of our beliefs and may therefore be used as a compass to 
navigate safely the theoretical world. Their purpose, that is, is not just that of eliciting intuitions 
(intuition pumps), but to keep them under control. They do this by increasing the level of 
reflective equilibrium amongst intuitions themselves. Reflective equilibrium amongst intuitions, 
of course, would be a necessary but not sufficient condition that any philosophical theory has to 
satisfy in order to play an explanatory role, and hence to produce knowledge. The missing 
sufficient condition, I contend, is provided by empirical science. It follows that the main purpose 
of most philosophical thought experiments is that of making us more rational and in so doing 
they conform to what Sorensen calls the cleansing model of armchair inquiry. An important side 
effect of their main purpose, I contend further, is that of enhancing our understanding of reality. 
As a matter of fact, while on the one hand I believe that thought experiments have to do with 
understanding more than with knowledge, I try to argue, on the other, that understanding itself 
has a lot more to do with knowledge than we usually think. It is a plain fact, I maintain, that our 
theoretical notions usually reflect deeper ontological commitments, i. e. that they normally reveal 
our expectations as to how the world must be, and by so doing they certainly do contribute 
significantly to our understanding of that world. 
So, one might ask, what is the proper subject matter of thought experiments? What are these 
cognitive instruments produced by our imagination really talking about? The world or the 
words? It has recently been suggested that “broadly speaking, views about philosophical analysis 
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may be divided into those that take the targets of such analysis to be in-the-head psychological 
entities versus outside-the-head nonpsychological entities”334. According to a similar way to 
make the same point, the only two mutually exclusive answers to the question above, as applied 
to philosophical inquiry more generally, would be the following: Either (1) philosophy deals 
with the world, or (2) philosophy deals with the conceptual apparatus relying on which we deal 
with the world. Supporters of (1), in particular, usually hold that (2) introduces an unnecessary 
and highly artificial filter between us and the world, thereby launching a serious explanatory 
regress, and risking to fall pray of radical skepticism (of which, in their view, idealism would be 
one of the most unpalatable consequences). Their position, in other words, may be effectively 
epitomized by the following, intentionally provocative question: Why can’t we just talk about 
things, instead of talking about ways of talking about things? 
As I hope my work makes clear, I strongly believe that this way of looking at things dramatically 
oversimplifies matters. In other words, I think that Quine’s “Neurathian” suggestion, which I 
quoted at the opening of the present conclusions, is on the right track, especially when trying to 
tackle the many difficult epistemological questions raised by philosophical thought experiments. 
In the same spirit, I think that any effort to show the fundamental epistemic role played by our 
conceptual framework does not necessarily amount to giving up the very idea of a mind-
independent world. In other words, to hold that between an epistemic agent and reality or the 
world there is a conceptual framework, does not automatically commit one, I believe, to the 
thesis that the world does not exist (idealism), nor to the idea that an epistemic agent is 
hopelessly trapped within the boundaries of his own conceptual framework (solipsism). The 
limits of our linguistic resources, pace Wittgenstein, are not the limits of our worlds. 
Let me conclude by saying that, as I have tried to argue at the end of the third chapter above, I 
am confident that new light might be shed in the future on the nature of philosophical thought 
experiments by a careful attempt at properly locating them against the wider background of a 
burgeoning and relatively new area of research, namely the study of so called defeasible or non-
monotonic reasoning. The possibility of seeing a philosophical thought experiment as a very 
peculiar kind of defeasible inference, I particular, seems very promising as a starting point to 
begin charting, both from a logical and an epistemological point of view, that vast and still 
largely unknown territory in which normative and descriptive aspects of human cognition meet. 
It really seems to me like there is a lot of work ahead for our naturalist. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
The argument schemas reproduced in the table are drawn from Häggqvist (1996, 2009b). 
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